HABEAS CORPUSHABEAS CORPUSHABEAS CORPUSHABEAS CORPUSHABEAS CORPUS
I. CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS
U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 2. “The privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require
it.”
II. IMPLEMENTING STATUTES AND RULES
On April 24, 1996, the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) went into effect.
This legislation substantially changed, both substan-
tively and procedurally, habeas corpus practice in both
capital and non-capital cases. See Felker v. Turpin, 518
U.S. 651, 654, 116 S.Ct. 2333, 135 L.Ed.2d 827
(1996); 28 U.S.C. § 2241 et seq. The law generally
applies to petitions filed on or after April 24, 1996. Lindh
v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d
481 (1997). 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) governs appellate
court proceedings filed after AEDPA’s effective date;
thus, a state prisoner whose petition predated the
effective date of the AEDPA, but who seeks to appeal from
an adverse decision on the petition, must apply for a
certificate of appealability. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.
473, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); Hohn v.
United States, 524 U.S. 236, 248, 118 S.Ct. 1969, 141
L.Ed.2d 242 (1998). 28 U.S.C. § 2241 establishes
jurisdiction to grant the writ and the basis therefor. 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b) addresses second or successive
petitions and 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) institutes a one-year
time limitation for the filing of a habeas petition. 28
U.S.C. § 2253 addresses the need for a certificate of
appealability to appeal from a final judgment in a habeas
case. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c) address exhaustion of
state remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) sets out the
standard for the issuance of the writ and 28 U.S.C. §
2254(e) addresses factual findings and evidentiary
hearings. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 relates to prisoners
challenging federal convictions. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2261
through 2266 address prisoners in state custody
pursuant to a capital sentence.
The Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, 28 U.S.C.
foll. § 2254 (Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases), are
apparently still applicable, at least to the extent they do
not conflict with the current law. These rules address,
inter alia, the proper respondent (Rule 2); summary
dismissal by the district court judge (Rule 4); discovery
requests (Rule 6); expansion of the record (Rule 7);
applicability of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to
habeas proceedings (Rule 11).III. NATURE OF THE WRIT
“The writ of habeas corpus is the fundamental
instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against
arbitrary and lawless state action.” Wise v. Fulcomer, 958
F.2d 30, 33 (3d Cir. 1992). In Williams v. Taylor, 529
U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000), the
United States Supreme Court interpreted 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d)(1), which provides that a state prisoner whose
claim has been adjudicated on the merits in the state
courts may obtain federal habeas relief if the state court
decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.”According to the Court, a state court decision will be
contrary to established Supreme Court precedent “if the
state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing
law set forth in the Court’s cases” or “if the state court
confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguish-
able from” those underlying a Supreme Court decision
and nevertheless arrives at a result different from Supreme
Court precedent. Williams v. Taylor, 120 S.Ct. at 1519-
20.An unreasonable application of clearly established
Supreme Court case law must be “objectively
unreasonable.” Id. at 1521. Moreover, an “unreasonable
application of federal law is different from an incorrect
application of federal law.” Id. at 1522. A federal court
may not grant habeas relief because in its independent
judgment the state court decision applied the law
“erroneously or incorrectly”; the application must also be
unreasonable. Id. at 1522.Finally, whatever Supreme Court case law would
qualify as an “old rule” in the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence engendered by Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989), will
constitute “clearly established Federal law, as determined
by the Supreme Court of the United States,“ 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1). Id. at 1523.Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 156, 120 S.Ct. 2113,
147 L.Ed.2d 125 (2000), rejecting a capital defendant’s
claim under Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154,
114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994) (when future
dangerousness is at issue, due process requires that the
jury be informed of defendant’s parole ineligibility under
state law if a life sentence rather than a sentence of death