v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43
(1998). In Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 909,
2 L.Ed.2d 963 (1960), the Supreme Court ruled that
upon a habeas petitioner’s unconditional release from
state custody, his habeas case, commenced when the
petitioner was still in custody, became “moot” and the
Court could not proceed to adjudicate the merits of the
petition. The Supreme Court overruled Parker in Carafas
v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d
- The petitioner in Carafas had filed his petition in
1963 and pursued it through the federal courts; he was
unconditionally released from custody two weeks before
he filed his petition for certiorari, which was subsequently
granted. The Court held it was “clear” that the
petitioner’s case was not moot, in light of the several
collateral disabilities resulting from his conviction,
including a prohibition on voting in any New York
election, serving as a juror and, in petitioner’s case,
serving as a labor union official. According to the Court,
a habeas petitioner should not have to continue to suffer
the consequential disabilities flowing from a conviction
which the petitioner alleges is unconstitutional “simply
because the path has been so long that he has served his
sentence.”
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20
L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). Criminal appeal of appellant who
finished serving his six-month sentence while his appeal
was pending in the New York courts was not “moot”
because appellant took all expeditious steps necessary to
get his case before the courts and his conviction
engendered several disabilities, including that by New
York statute the conviction could be used to impeach
appellant’s moral character if he should put it into issue
at some later criminal trial and that a sentencing court in
the future could use the conviction as a factor in
sentencing.
Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83
L.Ed.2d 821 (1985). Habeas petitioner’s case was not
moot, notwithstanding that he was finally released from
custody and his civil rights, including suffrage and the
right to hold public office, were restored during the
pendency of the appeal, because the petitioner had “not
been pardoned and some collateral consequences of his
conviction remain, including the possibility that the
conviction would be used to impeach testimony he might
give in a future proceeding and the possibility that it
would be used to subject him to persistent felony
offender prosecution if he should go to trial on any other
felony charges in the future. This case is thus not moot.”
Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 77 S.Ct. 481,
1 L.Ed.2d 393 (1957), held that “[t]he possibility of
consequences collateral to the imposition of sentence is
sufficiently substantial to justify our dealing with the
merits.”Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 113 S.Ct.
2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993), rejected a mootness
contention in a case where the respondent was found
guilty of a drug charge and sentenced to probation under
a diversionary statute which provided that upon
successful completion of the probation the original
charges would be dismissed. Notwithstanding that the
respondent’s diversionary treatment was not considered
a conviction for purposes of state disabilities or
disqualifications, the Court found a “live controversy”
because the otherwise nonpublic record could be used if
the respondent had further difficulties with the law and
could be used in calculating respondent’s criminal
history in the federal sentencing courts.Pringle v. Court of Common Pleas, 744 F.2d 297,
stated “Once established, habeas corpus jurisdiction
cannot be defeated by the commutation or vacation of the
petitioner’s sentence unless the prior conviction carries
with it no substantial collateral legal consequences.” In
this case, Pringle was still subject to a custodial sentence
when she filed her habeas petition.Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 102 S.Ct. 1322, 71
L.Ed.2d 508 (1982). Convicted felons, who had
completed their sentences and were challenging the
mandatory period of parole (which they had violated) to
be served at the end of their sentences, argued
unsuccessfully in favor of non-mootness that the
revocation of parole could be used against them in any
other future parole proceedings. The Court found no
disabilities such as those recognized in Carafas v. LaValle,
391 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554.In Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140
L.Ed.2d 43, the habeas petition of individual challenging
parole revocation was declared moot, that is, not
presenting an Article II case or controversy, where
sentence expired prior to district court’s consideration of
habeas petition. While most criminal convictions
engender adverse collateral consequences, parole
revocations do not; moreover, the petitioner failed to
demonstrate any collateral consequences sufficient to
satisfy the “injury-in-fact” requirement of Article III.