Petition dismissed for failure to exhaust and for failure to
name an indispensable party, the District Attorney in
Texas who placed the allegedly unlawful detainer on
petitioner.
Reimnitz v. State’s Attorney of Cook County, 761 F.2d
405 (7th Cir. 1985). Failure to name the proper
respondent deprived the district court of jurisdiction.
VI. PRO SE PETITIONS
Pro se petitions are held to less stringent standards
than pleadings prepared by lawyers. Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976), reh’g
denied, 429 U.S. 1066, 97 S.Ct. 798, 50 L.Ed.2d 785
(1977). Consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
8(f), which states that “[a]ll pleadings shall be so
construed as to do substantial justice,” is the well-
established principle that pro se pleadings are subject to
less stringent rules of specificity and should be construed
liberally. Lewis v. Attorney General, 878 F.2d 714 (3d
Cir. 1989); United States v. Garth, 188 F.3d 99 (3d Cir.
1999). A pro se habeas petition “may be inartfully
drawn”; judicial policy is to give such petitions “a liberal
construction” and read them “‘with a measure of
tolerance.’” United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley,
414 F.2d 552 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 912,
90 S.Ct. 2206, 26 L.Ed.2d 566 (1970) (quoting from
Wade v. Yeager, 377 F.2d 841, 846 (3d Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 893, 89 S.Ct. 218, 21 L.Ed.2d 173
(1968)); Royce v. Hahn, 151 F.3d 116 (3d Cir. 1998).
VII. TIME LIMITATIONS
Before the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act went into effect, there were virtually no time
constraints on habeas corpus petitions. Indeed, the only
time limitation was for a petition relying on a claim that
could have been known earlier and was so “delayed” that
the State was prejudiced in responding to it. Rule 9(a),
Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. See also Ross v.
Artuz, 150 F.3d 97 (2d Cir. 1998); Campas v.
Zimmerman, 876 F.2d 318 (3d Cir. 1989) (To obtain
dismissal on the basis of delay State must make a
“particularized showing of prejudice” and must “relate its
prejudice to the petitioner’s delay and prove that the
delay in filing was the very cause of the State’s
prejudice.”); Clency v. Nagle, 60 F.3d 751 (11th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1081, 116 S.Ct. 792, 133
L.Ed.2d 741 (1996).
While a petition may still be barred by application of
Rule 9(a), Ross v. Artuz, 150 F.3d 97, the AEDPA now
provides for a one-year time limitation on the filing of a
petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). This limitation period
runs from the latest date that (1) direct review is
concluded or the time for seeking such review has expired,
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); (2) a State-created legal
impediment in violation of the federal constitution or
laws is removed, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(B); (3) a
constitutional right asserted has been newly recognized
by the Supreme Court and made retroactive to cases on
collateral review, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(C), or (4) the
factual predicate of a claim could have been discovered
with reasonable diligence, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(D).
A timely filed habeas petition may be amended after the
limitations period has expired so long as the amendment
merely clarifies or amplifies a claim or theory set out in the
original petition and does not seek to add a new claim or
theory. United States v. Thomas, 221 F.3d 430 (3d Cir.
2000).A. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) and Direct ReviewBarefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 77
L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983). “[I]f a federal question is
involved,” the direct review process “includes the right to
petition this Court for a writ of certiorari.”Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565 (3d Cir. 1999),
held that a state court criminal judgment is final for
purposes of federal habeas corpus review “at the
conclusion of review in the United States Supreme Court
or when the time for seeking certiorari review expires.”Morris v. Horn, 187 F.3d 333 (3d Cir. 1999). Where
petitioner did not seek certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court, his conviction became final for purposes
of federal habeas corpus review ninety days after the state
supreme court affirmed his death sentence. Accord, Jones
v. Morton, 195 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 1999).B. Mailbox RuleBurns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 1998), held
that a pro se prisoner’s habeas petition is deemed filed at
the moment that he or she delivers it to prison officials for
mailing to the court. The Burns court applied Houston v.
Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245
(1988), which established the “mailbox” rule: a pro se
prisoner’s notice of appeal is deemed filed at the moment
it was delivered to prison officials for mailing to the court.
Accord, Morales-Rivera v. United States, 184 F.3d 109 (1st
Cir. 1999) (mailbox rule applies provided prisoner uses,
if available, the prison system for recording legal mail and
noting that the court’s ruling did not preclude the