JUDGMENTJUDGMENTJUDGMENTJUDGMENTJUDGMENT
(See also, APPEALS, COURTS and DOUBLE
JEOPARDY, this Digest)
A judgment in a criminal matter is prepared and
signed by the court and entered by the clerk pursuant to
R. 3:21-5. A judgment of conviction should “set forth
the plea, the verdict or findings, the adjudication and
sentence, a statement of the reasons for such sentence,
and a statement of the credits received pursuant to R.
3:21-8" for confinement pending sentence. Id.; see also,
R. 3:21-6 (judgment of conviction of a corporation). In
any conflict between an oral pronouncement of sentence
and the written judgment of conviction, the oral
pronouncement prevails. State v. Rivers, 252 N.J. Super.
142, 147 (App. Div. 1991). The written judgment
merely embodies the determinations and the reasons for
them made at the time of sentencing. State v. Womack,
206 N.J. Super. 564, 570 (App. Div. 1985).
R. 1:13-1, however, permits a court to correct clerical
mistakes in judgments. Clerical errors may be corrected
notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal. See State v.
Matlack, 49 N.J. 491, 501-502 (1967), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 1009 (1967) (correction of clerical error so that
sentence actually intended by trial court may be given to
a defendant does not violate double jeopardy protection);
State v. Connors, 129 N.J. Super. 476, 484-485 (App.
Div. 1974) (court has power to amend record which
misstates real verdict, or judgment which misstates
court’s opinion). But see, State v. Schneider, 156 N.J.
Super. 53 (App. Div. 1978) (trial court does not have
power to correct illegal sentence while appeal from the
conviction is pending). However, R. 3:21-10(d) was
amended in 1981 to permit a trial court to reconsider a
sentence during the pendency of an appeal upon notice
to the Appellate Division.
With regard to the finality of a defendant’s sentence
in the context of a Fifth Amendment double jeopardy
analysis, jeopardy generally attaches when the defendant
begins to serve the sentence. State v. Dively, 92 N.J. 573,
588 (1983); State v. Ryan, 86 N.J. 1, 10 (1981). Double
jeopardy protection does not prohibit the State from
appealing a too lenient sentence, even though the
sentence has been partially served, so long as the appeal
is authorized by statute. State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 344-
345 (1984). However, “the judgment of conviction
cannot embody a sentence which constitutes an increase
above that originally imposed by the trial judge, unless an
appellate court orders an increase or reconsideration or
unless an illegal sentence is subsequently corrected.”
State v. Womack, supra, 206 N.J. Super. at 570 (citations
omitted).Generally, a judicial determination is appealable
when it is a “final judgment.” R. 2:2-1; R. 2:2-3.
Exceptions are certain interlocutory determinations that
are deemed final, see R. 3:28(f) and interlocutory
determinations that are appealable by leave of court. See
R. 2:2-4. For purposes of appeal, a judgment is final
when it adjudicates all claims involving all parties, and
anything less is interlocutory. Pressler, Current N.J.
Court Rules, comment 2 on R. 2:2-3 (2000).Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:46-1, fines, restitution, and
other monetary requitals imposed in accordance with the
Code are to be entered on the record of docketed
judgments, where they “have the same force as ... civil
judgment[s] docketed in the Superior Court.” N.J.S.A.
2C:46-1a. In addition to specific means of enforcement,
for example, through contempt power, the Code
authorizes collection of monetary portions of a criminal
sentence by the “measures ... authorized for the
collection of an unpaid civil judgment entered against [a]
defendant in an action of debt.” N.J.S.A. 2C:46-2b.
Anti-drug profiteering penalties imposed pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 2C:35A-1 et seq. and anti-money laundering
penalties imposed pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:21-23 et seq.,
likewise, are to be docketed and collected as monetary
judgments in accordance with the provisions of N.J.S.A.
2C:46-1 et seq. N.J.S.A. 2C:21-27.6; N.J.S.A. 2C:35A-
8.R. 3:9-2 provides that the court, for good cause
shown, may order that a guilty plea in a criminal matter
not be used in any civil matter. R. 3:9-2. The purpose
of this provision is to avoid the unnecessary trial of a
criminal case where a defendant will not plead guilty
because of the civil implications of the guilty plea. State
v. Haulaway, Inc., 257 N.J. Super. 506, 508 (App. Div.
1992). In State v. Schlanger, 203 N.J. Super. 289 (Law
Div. 1985), numerous defendants who pled guilty to
racketeering charges involving a long-term, profitable
conspiracy sought a no-civil-use order to avoid civil
responsibility for their conduct. The court denied
defendants’ application, concluding that mere avoidance
of civil liability is not “good cause,” particularly in light
of the Legislature’s repeatedly expressed concern for
crime victims. Id. See also State v. Haulaway, 257 N.J.
Super. at 509 (“‘good cause’ exists for a no-civil-use
agreement when such an agreement is necessary to