cdTOCtest

(coco) #1

opening statements are not evidence. State v. Boyer, 221
N.J.Super. 387, 397 (App. Div. 1987), certif. denied, 110
N.J. 299 (1988); see State v. Mance, 300 N.J.Super. 37,
54-55 (App. Div. 1997).



  1. Trial court cannot remove a juror who, during
    deliberations that a relative told him or her that police
    often beat criminals. Proper remedy generally will be a
    mistrial when jury is exposed to extraneous information
    during deliberations. State v. Adams, 320 N.J.Super. at
    364-68; see State v. Harvey, 318 N.J.Super. 167, 173-74
    (App. Div. 1999); but see State v. Mance, 300 N.J.Super.
    at 54-57.

  2. Juror’s removal during deliberations because he
    needed to get back to work was not compelling, and he
    was not unable to perform his duties as a juror and
    continue to deliberate. State v. Williams, 336 N.J. Super.
    at 118-23.


VI. FAIR CROSS-SECTION REQUIREMENTS


A. Generally



  1. Defendant is entitled to jury panel selected
    without intentional systematic exclusion of identifiable
    substantial class of citizens. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S.
    522 (1975); State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 561
    (1999) (defendant has right to an impartial jury drawn
    from a representative cross-section of the community).

  2. Defendant not entitled to jury of any particular
    composition, but jury pool must not systematically
    exclude distinctive groups within the community.
    Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. at 538; State v.
    Timmendequas, 161 N.J. at 563; accord, State v. Zicarelli,
    154 N.J.Super. 347 (App. Div. 1977).

  3. Prospective grand and petit jury panel members
    must be chosen on a random basis, whether the method
    of selection so employed is manual or mechanical, so as
    not to offend defendant’s right to a fair and impartial
    trial. State v. Long, 204 N.J.Super. 469 (Law Div. 1985).

  4. Cross-section requirement does not require that
    panel from which petit jury drawn reflects panel drawn
    from county where offense occurred. State v. Harris, 282
    N.J.Super. 409, 415-21 (App. Div. 1995).

  5. Age is not determinative, and neither students nor
    clergy form “cognizable group” which, if excluded,
    would deprive jury of cross-sectional quality. State v.
    Butler, 155 N.J.Super. 270 (App. Div. 1978); see also


Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); State v.
Anderson, 132 N.J.Super. 231 (App. Div.), certif. denied,
68 N.J. 143 (1975).


  1. Use of voter registration lists as source of names for
    jury service valid even though qualified members of
    particular class are under-represented on such lists. State
    v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. at 225; State v. Smith, 102 N.J.Super.
    325 (Law Div. 1968), aff’d 55 N.J. 476, cert. denied, 400
    U.S. 949 (1970); see also State v. Porro, 152 N.J.Super.
    259 (Law Div. 1977), after remand 158 N.J.Super. 269
    (App. Div.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1047 (1978).

  2. Jury selection process reforms should have
    prospective application only. State v. Long, 216
    N.J.Super. 269 (App. Div. 1987). Trial court
    determination that Atlantic County jury selection
    process did not meet statutory randomness requirement
    is not applicable to defendant’s challenge to the selection
    process where the retroactive application of the rule
    would have a negative impact on the administration of
    justice, where there would be no purpose served by
    dismissing indictments pursuant to the grand jury
    challenge, and where defendant had suffered no
    prejudice by the jury process at the time of his conviction.
    State v. Long, 204 N.J.Super. at 485-90; see also State v.
    Russo, 213 N.J.Super. 219 (Law Div. 1986).


VII. SEQUESTRATION; DISPERSAL; REAS-


SEMBLY OF JURORS


A. Generally

N.J.S.A. 2C:27-2b prohibits bribing a juror, and
N.J.S.A. 2C:29-8 criminalizes corrupting or influencing
a jury. See R. 1:8-6.

Trial judges should avoid jury sequestration except in
compelling circumstances. State v. Allen, 73 N.J. 132,
142 (1977), abrogated o.g. State v. Williams, 93 N.J. 39
(1983). But their decisions on sequestration will not be
reversed absent abuse of discretion. State v. Harris, 156
N.J. 122, 228 (1998); State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 214
(1997), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1085, 120 S.Ct. 811, 145
L.Ed. 2d 683 (2000). Factors to be considered by the
court in permitting dispersal include identity of
defendant, length of trial, kind of public interest
evidenced, and day and hour deliberations begin.

B. Reassembly Following Verdict, Discharge, Dispersal

Essential factor in determining whether discharged
jury can be reassembled to further deliberate or report on
Free download pdf