JUVENILESJUVENILESJUVENILESJUVENILESJUVENILES
I. PHILOSOPHY OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
Because of their age and unique susceptibility to peer
group and environmental influence, juveniles tradition-
ally have been treated differently than their adult
counterparts. As a result, youths have not been subjected
to the full rigors of the adult criminal justice system. The
emphasis of the juvenile justice system has been placed
upon the need to rehabilitate. In an effort to reform the
youth, a sociological rather than strictly punitive
approach has been utilized upon disposition. The
primary focus has been placed upon an individualized
diagnosis of the reasons for the particular juvenile’s
misbehavior, as well as an examination of the services or
treatment he needs in order to effectuate his reformation.
See generally, State in the Interest of Carlo, 48 N.J. 224
(1966); State v. Tuddles, 38 N.J. 565, 571 (1962); State
in the Interest of D.B.S., 137 N.J. Super. 371, 375 (App.
Div. 1975), certif. denied, 70 N.J. 144 (1976); State in the
Interest of L.N., 109 N.J. Super. 278, 285-287 (App.
Div.), aff’d o.b. 57 N.J. 165 (1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
1009 (1971); State in the Interest of W.O., 100 N.J. Super.
358, 362 (App. Div. 1962).
Traditionally, juvenile proceedings were viewed as
civil, rather than criminal in nature. Consequently,
juvenile hearings were characterized by informality and
flexibility. In recent years, emphasis has been placed
upon extending many adult constitutional safeguards to
youths.
The most recent revision of the statutory laws
pertaining to the juvenile justice system was enacted in
conjunction with the abolition of the juvenile and
domestic relations courts and the creation of the Family
Part of the Chancery Division of the Superior Court in
- The Code of Juvenile Justice (N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-20
to 49) was enacted by L. 1982, c. 77 and became effective
December 31, 1983. The revision recognized that the
public welfare and best interests of juveniles could be
served most effectively through an approach which
provided for harsher penalties for juveniles who commit
serious acts or who are repetitive offenders, while
broadening family responsibility and the use of
alternative dispositions for juveniles committing less
serious offenses. See State v. H.B., 259 N.J. Super. 603,
607 (Ch. Div. 1992) (emphasis is on the family, rather
than the juvenile, in developing a total rehabilitative
plan).
The provisions of the new Code and other
accompanying statutes were meant to reflect a
philosophy which is pragmatic and realistic in nature
rather than bound to any particular ideology, See Senate
Judiciary Committee Statement to New Jersey Assembly Bill
No. 641, and to deal more strictly with serious offenders.
See State in the Interest of R.G.D., 108 N.J. 1, 9 (1987).
Thus, while rehabilitation traditionally has been
regarded as the overarching objective of juvenile
delinquency statutory schemes, and remains a primary
goal of our Juvenile Code, nevertheless, the Code also
reflects a correlative emphasis on public safety and
deterrence. State in the Interest of J.L.A., 136 N.J. 370,
377-379 (1994). Punishment has now joined
rehabilitation as a component of the State’s core mission
concerning juvenile offenders. State v. Presha, 163 N.J.
304, 314 (2000).II. JURISDICTION OF THE FAMILY COURT
A. GenerallyThe Family Court has exclusive jurisdiction over
delinquency cases and matters relating to a juvenile-
family crisis. Jurisdiction extends in these matters over
the juvenile and his parent, guardian or any family
member found to be contributory to a juvenile-family
crisis. N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-24.The court has jurisdiction over the cases of all
individuals who are younger than 18 at the time of the
commission of an offense. If over 18 when the offense is
committed, a person is considered an adult and does not
fall under the Family Court’s jurisdiction. N.J.S.A.
2A:4A-22; N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-24.Patterson v. Monmouth Regional High School, 222 N.J.
Super. 448 (App. Div. 1987), although decided in the
context of a statute of limitations issue in a personal injury
suit, held that a person reaches the age of 18 on the actual
date of his birthday, thereby rejecting the common law
“coming of age” rule relied upon in State In the Interest of
F.W., 130 N.J. Super. 513 (J. & D.R. Ct. 1974), which
held that a person is considered to be 18 on the day before
his actual birthday.State in the Interest of C.P. & R.D., 212 N.J. Super.
222 (Ch. Div. 1986), held that while the Family Court
has exclusive jurisdiction over those under 18 years of age
who are charged with committing a delinquent act, there
is no statutory lower age limit. This case considered
whether six and nine year old juvenile codefendants could
be held for trial on charges of aggravated sexual assault.