rehabilitation and the circumstances motivating the
juvenile to carry a knife on the night in question.
- Time and Nature of a Waiver Hearing
State v. Lueder, 74 N.J. 62, 77 (1977); State in the
Interest of B.T., 145 N.J. Super. 268 (App. Div. 1976),
certif. denied, 73 N.J. 49 (1977). A waiver hearing is a
preliminary proceeding to determine the propriety of
transferring jurisdiction over a youth to the adult
criminal process. It is analogous to a probable cause
hearing prior to indictment or the determination of a
grand jury to indict. In contrast with an adjudicatory
hearing, a waiver hearing plays no part in the process of
deciding innocence or guilt. The demands of due process
at such a preliminary stage of the proceedings only
mandate a fair hearing where the youth is represented by
counsel and has an opportunity to be heard and present
evidence. Consequently, constitutional guarantees
concerning the trial process and the rules of evidence do
not apply to such a preliminary jurisdictional hearing.
State in the Interest of A.T., 245 N.J. Super. 224 (App.
Div. 1991), explained that probable cause within the
context of a juvenile waiver proceeding is no more than a
well-grounded suspicion or belief that an offense has
taken place and that the juvenile was a party to it. On the
State’s motion for waiver, the trial judge is not allowed to
weigh the evidence to determine where the truth of the
matter lay; hearsay evidence may be relied upon, and the
judge’s disapproval of both the manner in which the
police conducted their investigation and the circum-
stances of the juvenile’s identification are irrelevant.
State in the Interest of W.M., 265 N.J. Super. 413 (Ch.
Div. 1992), concluded that the State cannot rely solely
upon transcripts of unsworn, unsigned statements of the
juveniles to satisfy the probable cause element of a waiver
motion.
It is not clear whether at a waiver hearing the juvenile
is entitled to present evidence on his own behalf with
respect to the probable cause finding. The question was
noted but not addressed in State in the Interest of A.T., 245
N.J. Super. 224, 227 n.1 (App. Div. 1991). In State in
the Interest of B.G., 247 N.J. Super. 403, 423 (App. Div.
1991), the court found no denial of due process in the
extended waiver hearing where the juveniles were
permitted to proffer their own evidence as probable
cause. But see, State in the Interest of R.G.D., 108 N.J. 1,
16 (1987) (appearing to limit juvenile’s probable cause
evidence to that related to rehabilitation).
State in the Interest of A.L., 271 N.J. Super. 192, 203,
211-213 (App. Div. 1994); State v. Ferguson, 255 N.J.
Super. 530, 537-538 (App. Div. 1992); N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-- A juvenile’s testimony at a waiver hearing is
immunized to ensure that he can participate fully at any
stage of the waiver proceeding. This statutory immunity
encompasses both use and derivative-use immunity.
State in the Interest of J.L.W., 236 N.J. Super. 336
(App. Div. 1989). When determining probable cause at
a waiver hearing, the judge is limited to a consideration
of the evidence presented, including its adequacy, and
may not infer that the testimony of witnesses the State
declined to produce would be adverse to its interests.
Here, the evidence was adequate to establish probable
cause where the State offered sworn statements of
eyewitnesses, even though it did not offer live testimony
(as the trial judge requested) from two eyewitnesses, and
one eyewitness had made a request to “drop the charges.”
Moreover, no adverse inference should be drawn, because
the prosecutor seeks to minimize the number of times a
victim or witness must be exposed to the rigors of
testifying, and no adverse inference was appropriate for
the witness who dropped the charges - such a situation
fairly implied the witness feared reprisal rather than that
the charges were false.State in the Interest of J.W., 287 N.J. Super. 157 (Ch.
Div. 1995). N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-26d and R. 5:22-2 require
the prosecutor to file a motion seeking waiver of Family
Part jurisdiction within 30 days of receiving the
complaint, which time shall not be extended except for
good cause shown. Here, the State established good cause
for filing the motion 91 days after the original complaint
was filed in Hudson County, where change of venue to
Middlesex County was not effected until 86 days after
filing the original complaint, the juvenile’s original
attorney testified that the handling of the venue transfer
was routine and timely, the juvenile was 15 years old and
not prejudiced, there was no evidence that Hudson
County had technology to permit a more expedited
transfer, and the decision to change venue was mutually
agreed to by both parties.In State in the Interest of J.S., 272 N.J. Super. 338 (Ch.
Div. 1993), a delay of more than two years between the
time the juvenile was charged with alleged acts of
delinquency and the time of the waiver hearing did not
prejudice him or violate his due process rights, where the
juvenile could not have proven the likelihood of his
rehabilitation by age 19 even if the waiver hearing had
been conducted at the time he was charged. The juvenile
was approximately 17 years, four months old when