cdTOCtest

(coco) #1

  1. Members of State Boards


State v. Seaman, 114 N.J. Super. 19 (App. Div.
1971), certif. denied, 58 N.J. 594 (1971), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1015 (1972). Defendant was the secretary of
the State Board of Certified Public Accountants. He had
the exclusive jurisdiction and discretion for reviewing and
regrading the examination papers of candidates who
failed to pass the examination to become a certified public
accountant. He accepted money from unsuccessful
candidates as an inducement to regrade examination
papers. The Appellate Division held that this conduct
constituted the crime of misconduct in office.



  1. Pension Commissioners


State v. Deegan, 126 N.J. Super. 475 (App. Div.
1974), certif. denied, 65 N.J. 283 (1974). By statute and
judicial interpretation, pension commissioners ap-
pointed to administer a county’s pension laws are duty-
bound to (a) determine whether an employee is qualified
to receive a pension because of a physical disability; (b)
determine whether an alleged disability is work-
connected; and (c) prohibit the improper reinstatement
of previously withdrawn pension employees. Thus,
failure to perform these legal duties may subject the
offender to the charge of misconduct in office.



  1. Teachers


State v. Parker, 124 N.J. 628 (1991), cert. denied,
503 U.S. 939 (1992), concluded that the defendant, a
teacher, could be convicted of official misconduct for
exhibiting sexually explicit magazines to her students,
and having the students makes collages from
photographs cut out of those magazines despite her
acquittal on the underlying offenses of sexual assault and
child endangerment. In so holding, the Court reaffirmed
that charges of official misconduct may be sustained
without proof of a criminal act and that sexual
gratification is a benefit withing the meaning of the
official misconduct statute.


E. Acts “Relating To A Public Servant’s Office”


Under subsection (a) of N.J.S.A. 2C:30-2, the State
must prove that the public servant’s act both “related to
his office” and also constituted an “unauthorized exercise
of his official functions.” Thus, the mere fact that the
defendant’s act falls within the second prong -- i.e., the
mere fact that the defendant public servant did
something which he was not authorized to do --
obviously does not foreclose the prosecutor from


establishing the first prong -- i.e., from establishing that
the defendant’s unauthorized act nevertheless “related to
his office.” See State v. Schultz, 71 N.J. 590, 602 (1976).
“[S]o long as the alleged misconduct is at all related to his
official duties, express or inherent,” criminal liability will
attach. State v. Begyn, 34 N.J. 35, 43 (1961). For
example, “when a public officer undertakes or assumes to
perform certain public duties by virtue of his office and
as if incident to his office, and he wilfully engages in
unlawful behavior which violates the duties undertaken
or assumed, he will not be heard to say that such duties
were not required by, or incidental to, his office, but were
assigned by law to some other public office not held by
him.” State v. Silverstein, 41 N.J. 203, 208 (1963).

Conversely, however, the fact that the public servant
committed an unauthorized act does not, by itself,
establish that that act related to his office. State v. Hinds,
143 N.J. 540, 549 (1996); State v. Schultz, 71 N.J. at
601-602. For example, a police officer has a duty not to
commit crime. State v. Cohen, 32 N.J. 1 (1960).
Nevertheless, criminal conduct by a police officer does
not, by itself, render the officer guilty of official
misconduct unless the criminal conduct also relates to his
duties as a police officer. State v. Schultz, supra; Kauffman
v. Glassboro, 181 N.J. Super. 273, 277-78 (App. Div.
1981), certif. denied, 91 N.J. 523 (1982). In Kauffman,
the defendant police officer was indicted both for
burglary and for official misconduct premised upon his
alleged commission of the burglary. The court held that
a police officer’s commission of burglary, without more,
does not constitute the crime of official misconduct
because it does not necessarily relate to his office.

However, in State v. Hinds, 143 N.J. at 547-49,
defendant, a private security manager, was convicted of
official misconduct as an accomplice after having
conspired with an off-duty police officer to engage in
shoplifting. He alleged that a police officer who commits
a crime unrelated to his office and while off duty does no
more than commit the underlying crime. The Supreme
Court of New Jersey disagreed, reasoning that because
the jury convicted defendant of theft by receiving stolen
property, it must have found him to be thief. Thus, the
codefendant had a duty to report defendant’s crimes. His
failure to do so conferred a benefit to defendant and also
obtained a benefit for himself, thereby subjecting him to
criminal liability for official misconduct. See also State v.
Bullock, 136 N.J. 149 (1994) (by identifying himself as
member of the “New Jersey Task Force” and showing his
State Police identification card during alleged acts of
misconduct, defendant’s conduct was sufficiently related
to his office as state policeman); State v. Johnson, 127 N.J.
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