MOTOR VEHICLESMOTOR VEHICLESMOTOR VEHICLESMOTOR VEHICLESMOTOR VEHICLES
I. ARREST (See also, ARREST, this Digest)
A. Automobile Stops
- Generally
State v. Kadelak, 280 N.J. Super. 349 (App. Div.),
certif. denied 141 N.J. 98 (1995), ruled that the use of
Mobile Inspection Teams (MITs) by the Division of
Motor Vehicles to conduct random roadside inspections
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 39:8-2 is constitutionally
permissible.
In State v. Seymour, 289 N.J. Super. 80 (App. Div.
1996), the Appellate Division held that under the
eluding provision of the Code, like the resisting arrest
provision, a driver must stop his vehicle even if the
trooper’s reason for signalling is legal or illegal. Failure to
stop provided probable cause for arrest. The court
declined to find that operating the vehicle at 40 mph
provided grounds for the stop under the community care
taking doctrine.
State v. Allan, 283 N.J. Super. 622 (Law Div. 1995),
determined that while flight alone is not sufficient to
create a reasonable suspicion, where there had been a
lawful stop for a motor vehicle violation coupled with a
suspicion of intoxication, flight by the defendant was not
permitted.
- Community Care Taking
In State v. Martinez, 260 N.J. Super. 75 (App. Div.
1992), the driver was observed driving his vehicle at a
“snails pace,” although otherwise presenting no occasion
for inquiry. The stop of the vehicle, based upon the
observations of the officer was not arbitrary, random and
wholly without justification in the individual
circumstance. The function exercised by the police
officer was one of community care taking. But see, State
v. Seymour, 289 N.J. Super. 80, 88 (App. Div. 1996),
declining to find that slow operation in the right lane was
sufficient for stop based on community care taking
function; State v. Costa, 327 N.J. Super. 22 (App. Div.
1999), finding police officer’s conduct went beyond
acceptable community care taking, and was investigative
stop, but officer lacked reasonable suspicion to justify the
investigative stop of defendant in his parked vehicle.
In State v. Washington, 296 N.J. Super. 569 (App.
Div. 1997), defendant was observed weaving within his
lane of travel while driving at a speed of 36 miles per hour
in the 45 mile per hour zone and crossing over the travel
portion onto the shoulder portion of the roadway about
a “tire’s width.” The stop of the vehicle, based upon the
observations of the officer was not arbitrary, random and
wholly without justification in the individual
circumstance but was reasonable under the community
care taking function.State v. Cryan, 320 N.J. Super. 325 (App. Div. 1999),
reversed denial of defendant’s suppression motion and
his DWI conviction, holding that the police could not
justify stopping defendant’s vehicle under the
community caretaking function simply because he
waited a few seconds to proceed after a stop light turned
green. Furthermore, no reasonable and articulable
suspicion existed to stop defendant. The officer admitted
that he stopped defendant’s car on orders to pull over
every moving vehicle on his shift, and the prosecutor at
the suppression motion never argued that reasonable and
articulable suspicion justified the stop. Nevertheless, the
court affirmed that abnormal operation of a vehicle
clearly falls within the community care taking function,
as a reasonably objective basis to stop the vehicle.In State v. Garbin, 325 N.J. Super. 521 (App. Div.
1999), certif. denied 164 N.J. 560 (2000), under the
community care taking standard, police were justified in
entering the defendant’s garage in response to a possible
fire. The defendant was found in his truck in the garage
with the drive wheels spinning and causing the tires to
burn.- Legality of a Stop
In State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463 (1999), reinstating
the conviction, the Supreme Court explained that the
Appellate Division had improperly required the trial
judge to articulate the basis for findings concerning the
credibility of the witnesses engaged in an independent
assessment of the evidence as if it were the trial court. The
Appellate Division had conducted a de novo review of the
record using detailed mathematical calculations and
concluded that the State did not carry its burden of
proving that there was a reasonable basis for the stopping
of defendant’s vehicle. Municipal court judges are not
required to articulate detailed, subjective analyses of
factors such as demeanor and appearance to support
credibility determinations on each and every witness
presented before them.