principles articulated in Albertson v. Subversive Activities
Control Board, 382 U.S. 70, 86 S.Ct. 194, 15 L.Ed.2d
165 (1965), was distinguishable in that the statute does
not make non-disclosure of incriminating evidence a
crime.
- Speedy Trial (See also, SIXTH AMENDMENT,
this Digest)
State v. Farrell, 320 N.J. Super. 425 (App. Div.
1999), reversed defendant’s DWI and motor vehicle
convictions because of inexcusable delay in prosecuting
the charges. He was charged in January 1995 and
asserted his speedy trial right the following month, but
thereafter an inordinate number of continuances and
lengthy adjournments ensued, many of which the
prosecution and municipal court had caused. The Law
Division on defendant’s de novo appeal, while finding the
delay exorbitant, saw no bad faith on the State’s part, and
concluded that defendant’s speedy trial right was not
violated. The Appellate Division disagreed. None of the
excessive delays were fairly chargeable to defendant and
most were not reasonably explained and justified; the
municipal court itself was to blame for several of them.
Defendant also continually asserted his speedy trial right,
and was prejudiced to the extent that he incurred
additional costs and inconveniences. However, given the
excessive delays and the unjustified reasons for them, the
court did not have to consider prejudice to find that
defendant’s speedy trial right had been violated.
Vacating the convictions was necessary because the denial
of fundamental fairness was so great, and the integrity of
the judicial process so crippled.
Supreme Court Directive #1-84 “suggests” a 60-day
disposition for DWI cases. While that Directive has never
been reduced to a Court Rule, it is generally adhered to
by the Municipal Courts as a management tool, but it is
not an absolute requirement. See State v. Fox, 249 N.J.
Super. 521, 523, n.1, (Law Div. 1991); State v. Farrell,
320 N.J. Super. at 446-7.
- Conditional Guilty Plea - Suppression
State v. Giordano, 281 N.J. Super. 150 (App. Div.
1995) held that the municipal court’s ruling on the
admission of the defendants’ Breathalyzer results was not
properly considered under the motion to suppress rule,
R. 7:4-2(f) [now R. 7:5-2], and, therefore, could not be
appealed to the Law Division following a guilty plea.
Because motions to suppress Breathalyzer results do not
generally involve constitutional claims involving the
improper collection of physical evidence, R. 3:5-7 and R.
7:4-2(f) are not implicated. The Court also concluded
that R. 3:9-3(f), which permits defendant to preserve for
appeal adverse determinations on pretrial motions with
the consent of the prosecutor, is not applicable to
municipal court proceedings and that conditional guilty
pleas are not permitted in municipal court. R. 7:4-8.- Denial of Rights - Fabricated Evidence
In State v. Gookins, 135 N.J. 42 (1994), the New
Jersey Supreme Court reversed the convictions of all
defendants’ for drunk driving, where the only police
officer involved in these arrests had himself been
convicted of falsifying Breathalyzer results. The
objectivity and value of the Breathalyzer is irreparably
undermined when the person operating the machine
falsifies the results in order to fabricate evidence of guilt.
Because the arresting officer in these cases pleaded guilty
to fabricating Breathalyzer results in another drunk-
driving case and had been implicated in similar
misconduct in other cases, the officer’s misconduct
compelled the vacation of the guilty pleas and
accompanying judgments of conviction in these cases.D. Jury TrialState v. Hamm, 121 N.J. 109 (1990), cert. denied 499
U.S. 947, 111 S.Ct. 1413, 113 L.Ed.2d 466 (1991) and
State v. Graff, 121 N.J. 131 (1990), held that the
statutory penalties for DWI are not so severe as to clearly
reflect a legislative determination of a constitutionally
serious offense requiring a jury trial. Hamm was facing
a third DWI offense which would subject him to a
mandatory jail sentence, fines and mandatory
participation in an alcohol rehabilitation program. Graff
and his co-respondent Ellis were respectively charged
with a first and second DWI offense. The analysis by the
Court noted that the issue was primarily one of federal
constitutional right, because New Jersey has never
recognized a right to trial by jury for the motor-vehicle
violation of DWI. It is simply not a crime under New
Jersey law.E. Preservation of Breath SamplesState v. Young, 242 N.J. Super. 467 (App. Div. 1990),
rejected a request by the defense for production of
samples of the breath test reagent ampoules used to test
the defendant, relying on the holding in California v.
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d
413 (1984), that if the State was not required to save a
sample of the defendant’s breath as direct evidence of the
offense, it could not be required to save and produce for