matter of legislative discretion not requiring hearings nor
findings of fact, provided the traffic control devices
otherwise conform to the Manual of Uniform Traffic
Control Devices for Streets and Highways.
XV. TRUCKS
In State v. Churchdale Leasing Inc., 115 N.J. 83
(1989), defendants had been charged and convicted of
violations of N.J.S.A. 39:3-20b, operating constructor
registered vehicles in excess of the maximum allowable
registered weight of 70,000 pounds, and of N.J.S.A.
39:3-84b(4) operating a commercial motor vehicle with
a gross vehicle weight in excess of 80,000 pounds, or of
N.J.S.A. 39:3-84b(2), operating a commercial motor
vehicle with an axle weight in excess of 34,000 pounds.
The Appellate Division rejected defense claims that
N.J.S.A. 39:3-20 was a revenue statute and therefore,
defendants could avoid the excess weight violations under
N.J.S.A. 39:3-84.3j. The Supreme Court affirmed the
convictions for violation of N.J.S.A. 39:3-20, but
reversed the convictions for the excess weight violations
under N.J.S.A. 39:3-84b on the grounds that the
principle against cumulative punishment prohibited
penalizing the defendants with both violations based on
the same set of facts, even though defendants had violated
both statutes. The Supreme Court found that both the
registration weight and excess weight provisions of the
statute should be read as part of a comprehensive
legislative scheme for regulating overweight motor
vehicles. The Legislature designed a scheme to protect
the State’s road system from overweight vehicles
regardless of the State in which the vehicle is registered.
Even though defendant violated both statutes, in the
absence of a clear legislative statement that such
punishment was intended, imposition of fines for both
would constitute double punishment and could not be
permitted.
In State v. Pestana, 303 N.J. Super. 146 (App. Div.
1997), the Appellate Division narrowly construed the
provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:3-20b concerning the
maximum allowable speed for commercial motor vehicles
restricted as “constructor” vehicles. “Constructor”
registered vehicles are allowed to register for a gross
weight up to 70,000 pounds. In addition, these vehicles
are also permitted, under N.J.S.A. 39:3-84.1, to operate
with axle weights in excess of that permitted to other
commercial motor vehicles. See, N.J.S.A. 39:3-84b(1), -
84b(2) and -84b(3). However, a provision within
N.J.S.A. 39:3-20b, limits the maximum allowable speed
of “constructor” vehicles to 30 mph, when the vehicle is
operating with axle weights in excess of that ordinarily
permitted. Thus, a “constructor” registered vehicle
operating with excess axle weights at a speed in excess of
30 mph is subject to a speeding violation under N.J.S.A.
39:4-98. Speeding convictions are affirmed if the
requisite proof of speeding is presented. The Court in
Pestana also reviewed N.J.S.A. 39:3-84.3f, the “5% grace
allowance,” and reversed the trial court’s finding that the
“5% grace allowance” did not apply to the registration
weight limits of N.J.S.A. 39:3-20. See also, State v. Lemar
Inc., 151 N.J. Super. 60 (App. Div. 1977).In State v. Wallach, 296 N.J. Super. 93 (Law Div.
1996), defendant was charged and convicted of operating
overweight vehicles on an intrastate bridge, contrary to
N.J.S.A. 39:4-75. The Law Division rejected
defendant’s claim that the posting of maximum weight
limitation signs does not require approval of the
Commissioner of Transportation. The court found that
the determination to limit weight on county owned
bridges was not governed by the provisions of N.J.S.A.
39:4-8 or 39:4-202. Note, however, that an amendment
to N.J.S.A. 39:4-75, adopted subsequent to this case,
requires the posting of signs for intrastate bridge weight
limits.In State v. Genesis Leasing Corp., 197 N.J. Super. 284
(App. Div. 1987), operators of solid waste vehicles
registered in another State sought to claim the benefits of
an exemption from axle weight limits for solid waste
vehicles registered in New Jersey. N.J.S.A. 39:3-20c and
39:3-84.1a. The Appellate Division rejected the claim,
noting that the vehicles could have received dual
registration in their home State and in New Jersey, but
not dual title, and therefore, would have been eligible to
operate under the exemption. Relying on the holdings in
State v. E.H. Miller Trans. Co. Inc., 74 N.J. Super. 474
(App. Div. 1962), certif. denied 38 N.J. 306 (1962) and
State v. Gratale Bros., 26 N.J. Super. 581, (App. Div.
1953), that the purpose of the weight limitations is to
protect the highways from damage from overweight
vehicles, the Court concluded that it is inconceivable that
the Legislature would draw a classification in favor of
foreign over domestic truckers.In State v. Stratis Commercial Corp., 165 N.J. Super.
158 (App. Div. 1979), a challenge to the jursidictional
and statutory authority of the Bergen County Police to
stop and subject trucks to weight enforcement, the
Appellate Division confirmed that County Police officers
could, in fact, perform these functions. The defense had
claimed that only State Police officers were empowered to
stop and weigh trucks. The court disagreed, relying on
its earlier holding in State v. Horn, 117 N.J. Super. 72