POST-CONVICTION RELIEFPOST-CONVICTION RELIEFPOST-CONVICTION RELIEFPOST-CONVICTION RELIEFPOST-CONVICTION RELIEF
(See generally, R. 3:22-1 et seq.)
I. INTRODUCTION
Post-conviction relief, the state analogue to federal
habeas corpus relief, is a collateral proceeding. State v.
McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 482 (1997). As such, the rules
for obtaining such relief are different than those on direct
appeal. In addition to the requirement that defendant
prove his entitlement to such relief by a preponderance of
the credible evidence, State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459
(1992), the post-conviction relief rules contain a bar
against raising issues that could have been raised in a prior
proceeding, R. 3:22-4, and contain a statute of
limitations. R. 3:22-12. See Section III, infra. Also, the
grounds for post-conviction relief are circumscribed;
constitutional claims are limited to those that constitute
a “substantial denial” of constitutional rights. R. 3:22-
2(a). Post-conviction relief is not a substitute for direct
appeal, R. 3:22-3, and it is not an opportunity to
relitigate issues previously adjudicated on the merits. R.
3:22-5. The New Jersey Supreme Court has recognized
“the good reasons” behind these rules: the finality of
judgments and the consolidation of issues on direct
appeal. State v. D.D.M., 140 N.J. 83, 101 (1995); State
v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 575-576, 583-584 (1992).
See also State v. Lark, 117 N.J. 331, 343 (1989) (interest
of finality an “essential element” of criminal justice
system).
The post-conviction relief rules clearly embody the
principle that collateral review is distinct from direct
review. See State v. D.D.M., 140 N.J. at 102 (“the pursuit
of justice [on PCR] is bound by the record and
constrained by the rules that prescribe the standards
governing post-conviction relief”). A presumption of
finality and legality attaches to a conviction and sentence
once it has been affirmed on direct appeal. See Brecht v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719
(1993) (discussing habeas corpus relief). Post-conviction
relief is secondary and limited, reversed only for those
defendants who have been “grievously wronged.” See id.
Thus, in view of the limited and distinct nature of
collateral relief, an error which might warrant reversal on
direct appeal may not warrant reversal on collateral attack
against the judgment of conviction. See Id., quoting
United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165, 102 S.Ct.
1584 (1982). See also State v. Cerbo, 78 N.J. 595, 605
(1979) (issues cognizable on direct appeal not necessarily
cognizable on post-conviction review).
II. GROUNDS FOR RELIEF
R. 3:22-2 contains the grounds for relief that are
cognizable on post-conviction relief:a. Substantial denial in the conviction proceedings of
defendant’s rights under the Constitution of the United
States or the Constitution or laws of the State of New
Jersey;b. Lack of jurisdiction of the court to impose the
judgment rendered upon defendant’s conviction;c. Imposition of sentence in excess of or otherwise not
in accordance with the sentence authorized by law;d. Any ground heretofore available as a basis for
collateral attack upon a conviction by habeas corpus or any
other common-law or statutory remedy.It is clear that post-conviction relief is not a vehicle to
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict
defendant. State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. at 483; State v.
Morales, 120 N.J. Super. 197, 200 (App. Div. 1972),
certif. denied, 62 N.J. 77 (1972). Nor is post-conviction
relief the means by which to challenge the excessiveness
of a sentence. State v. Flores, 228 N.J. Super. 586, 591-
592 (App. Div. 1988), certif. denied, 115 N.J. 78 (1989).
Under R. 3:22-2(c), relief may be granted only when the
sentence is “in excess of or otherwise not in accordance
with the sentence authorized by law.” The rule is narrow
and it applies to two types of situations: 1) sentences that
exceed the penalties authorized by statute or a specific
offense; 2) sentences that are not imposed in accordance
with law, such as a sentence that does not include a
legislatively mandated parole bar. State v. Murray, 162
N.J. 240, 246-247 (2000). If a sentence is illegal, it may
be corrected at any time. R. 3:22-12.Thus, a challenge to the adequacy of the trial court’s
findings at sentencing and the sufficiency of its weighing
process are not cognizable on post-conviction relief. State
v. Flores, 228 N.J. Super. at 595. The same holds true for
a claim that consecutive sentences run afoul of the State
v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985) guidelines. Id. at 596.
However, a claim regarding a defendant’s entitlement to
gap-time credits has been held to pertain to the legality
of the sentence and, hence, is cognizable on post-
conviction relief. State v. Shabazz, 263 N.J. Super. 246,
251 (App. Div. 1993), certif. denied, 133 N.J. 444
(1993).