bedding, soap and running water, and was forced to
appear in court in a dirty and disheveled state with no
justification by the correctional authorities, he was
denied his right to a fair trial and fundamental fairness
required a reversal of his conviction. State v. Maisonet, 166
N.J. at 20-21.
III. PRETRIAL DETAINEES
Where it is alleged that a pretrial detainee has been
deprived of liberty without due process, the dispositive
inquiry is whether the challenged practices or policy
constitutes punishment or is reasonably related to a
legitimate governmental objective. Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 535, 539, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1872, 1874, 60
L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). In considering whether a specific
practice or policy is “reasonably related” to security
interests, courts should play a very limited role, since
such considerations are peculiarly within the province
and professional expertise of corrections officials. 441
U.S. at 541, n.23, 99 S.Ct. at 1875, n.23.
In Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 598, 104 S.Ct.
3227, 3234, 87 L.Ed.2d 438 (1984), the Supreme
Court held that the Constitution does not require that
pretrial detainees be allowed contact visits when
responsible, experienced administrators have determined
in their sound discretion that such visits will jeopardize
the security of the facility.
IV. GENERAL PAROLE PROVISIONS
Parole is not a constitutional right but an act of
leniency or grace and a device for the protection of society
through the rehabilitation of the offender. N.J. Parole Bd.
v. Byrne, 93 N.J. 192, 208 (1983); In re Trantino Parole
Application, 89 N.J. 347, 363 n.5 (1982); State v. Davis,
175 N.J. Super. 130, 145 (App. Div.), certif. denied 85
N.J. 136 (1980). Moreover, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly said that the due process clause does not give
an inmate a constitutionally protected liberty interest
simply because the State provides for the possibility of
parole. See, e.g., Jago v. Van Curen, 454 U.S. 14, 102
S.Ct. 31 70 L.Ed.2d 13 (1981). The New Jersey
Constitution guarantees only that “[a] system for the
granting of parole shall be provided by law.” N.J. Const.
(1947), Art. V., § II, ¶ 2. That provision does not
guarantee a liberty interest. N.J. Parole Bd. v. Byrne, 93
N.J. at 208.
While there is no constitutional or inherent right of
a convicted person to be conditionally released before the
expiration of a valid sentence, there is by statute a
protected expectation of parole in inmates who are
eligible for parole. Trantino v. New Jersey Parole Bd., 154
N.J. 19, 25 (1998).In Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Cor.,
442 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979), the
United States Supreme Court found that the Nebraska
parole procedure, which afforded an inmate the
opportunity to be heard and informed him in what
respects he fell short of qualifying for parole, if parole was
denied, complied with the due process requirements of
the Constitution. The Court found that there is no
constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to
be conditionally released before the expiration of a valid
sentence. 442 U.S. at 7, 99 S.Ct. at 2104. Merely
because a statutory expectation exists cannot mean that in
addition to the full panoply of due process required to
convict and confine, there must also be repeated,
adversary hearings in order to continue the confinement.
442 U.S. at 14, 99 S.Ct. at 2107.Public outrage over an imminent parole determina-
tion has no place in a parole proceeding and is to be given
no weight in a parole decision. In re Trantino Parole
Application, 89 N.J. at 376.In State v. Alford, 191 N.J. Super. 537 (App. Div.
1983), app. dism. 99 N.J. 199 (1984), the Appellate
Division held that a sentence which directed that one-
half of the total fine and VCCB penalty be paid before
defendant’s release constituted an unwarranted infringe-
ment on the authority of the State Parole Board. Id. at
540.
In New Jersey State Parole Bd. v. Gray, 200 N.J. Super.
343 (App. Div. 1985), the Appellate Division held that
the Parole Board can correct an error in a prisoner’s parole
eligibility date any time, and found no due process
violation in so recalculating the date without notice to the
prisoner or affording him a hearing. 200 N.J. Super. at
349.V. PAROLE STANDARDS
The Parole Act of 1979, N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.45 to
123.69 (effective April 21, 1980) substantially changed
the parole system in New Jersey. Prior to its adoption, the
parole system was governed by N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.1 to
123.44 (Parole Act of 1948). The former parole law
authorized parole only if the Parole Board determined
that “there is a reasonable probability that, if such
prisoner is released, he will assume his proper and rightful
place in society, without violation of the law, and that his
release is not incompatible with the welfare of society.”