the state following completion of his federal obligations.
Russillo v. Fauver, 225 N.J. Super. 308 (App. Div. 1988).
When one owes penalties to two separate sovereigns,
the order of punishment is a matter to be decided
between the sovereigns - it is a matter of comity between
them - and the decision arrived at is one which the convict
has no control. Breeden v. New Jersey Dept. of Corrections,
132 N.J. 457, 463 (1993); State v. Robbins, 124 N.J.
282, 289 (1991); State v. Williams, 92 N.J.Super. 560,
563 (App. Div. 1966).
XVIII. PRISON OVERCROWDING
In Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 101 S.Ct.
2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), the Supreme Court found
that the double celling of prisoners was not per se
unconstitutional and under the facts of this case did not
constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
In Worthington v. Fauver, 88 N.J. 183 (1982), the
Supreme court upheld the validity of Executive Order
No. 106, issued by the Governor on June 19, 1981, to
alleviate the potentially disastrous overcrowding of
inmates in state and county correctional institutions.
The Court found that the temporary emergency
executive orders were authorized by the Disaster Control
Act, N.J.S.A. App. A:9-30 et seq., and they did not violate
the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, 88
N.J. at 210.
In County of Gloucester v. State, 132 N.J. 141 (1993),
the Supreme Court held that the problem of prison
overcrowding no longer constituted an emergency within
the meaning of the Disaster Control Act and, thus, the
executive order authorizing housing of state prisoners in
county jails was invalidated.
Subsequent to Gloucester decision, the Legislature
enacted L. 1994, c. 12, which declared prison
overcrowding an emergency and authorized the
Governor to issue executive orders to address the
“crowding problem”. See Executive Order No. 16 (1994).
In 1996, the Legislature extended the Governor’s
executive authority over prison overcrowding for two
more years, L. 1996, c. 9. County of Morris v. Fauver, 153
N.J. 80, 90 (1998); County of Hudson v. Department of
Corrections, 152 N.J. 60, 68-69 (1997). See Executive
Order No. 48 (1996).
PRIVATE DETECTIVESPRIVATE DETECTIVESPRIVATE DETECTIVESPRIVATE DETECTIVESPRIVATE DETECTIVES
I. THE PRIVATE DETECTIVE ACT OF 1939
The private detective business is defined to include
the business of making for hire or reward any
investigation of, for example, crimes against the
government, the identity or conduct of any person or
organization, the whereabouts of missing persons, the
location of lost or stolen property, and the causes of fires,
accidents or injuries to persons or corporations. A private
detective business also means the furnishing for hire or
reward of watchmen, guards or private patrolmen to
protect persons or property or for any other purpose.
N.J.S.A. 45:19-10a.Strict regulation over the private detective business,
including control of those persons who desire to enter
that business, is within the public interest because of the
inherent potential for abuse. Schulman v. Kelly, 54 N.J.
364, 371 (1969). Thus, any person or firm which
engages in the private detective business without having
first obtained a license from the Superintendent of the
State Police is guilty of a misdemeanor. N.J.S.A. 45:19-
10.Every applicant for a private detective’s license must
be twenty-five years or older. No license shall be issued
to any person or firm unless such person or at least one
member of the firm has had at least five years experience
as an investigator or as a police officer within an organized
police department of any state or a county or
municipality thereof, or with an investigative agency of
the federal government. N.J.S.A. 45:19-12; Schulman v.
Kelly, 54 N.J. at 371; Artis v. New Jersey State Police, 93
N.J.A.R.2d 1, 2 (1992).A private detective licensee holds himself or herself
out to be a person of good character, competency and
integrity. Devlin v. Greiner, 147 N.J. Super. 446, 466-67
(Law Div. 1977). The ultimate purpose of the statutes
relating to the licensing of private detectives is to prevent
“disreputable, incompetent persons who would prey
upon the public from engaging in such business.” Berardi
v. Rutter, 42 N.J. Super. 39, 50-51 (App. Div. 1956),
aff’d 23 N.J. 485 (1957). Accordingly, N.J.S.A. 45:19-
12 permits that the Superintendent of State Police is
authorized to revoke a private detective’s license for cause;
a substantial defect in a detective’s good character,
competency and integrity is sufficient to render revocable
his or her license. Berardi v. Rutter, supra, 42 N.J. Super.
at 49, 50-52.