The probationary term is not tolled for any period
during which defendant absconds or is absent from the
State unless a probation violation complaint is filed with
the court before the expiration of the probationary term.
State v. DeChristino, 235 N.J. Super. 291, 295 (App. Div.
1989); State v. Hyman, 236 N.J. Super. 298, 302 (App.
Div. 1989).
Failure of a defendant to report to the probation
department constitutes grounds for revocation and
imprisonment. State v. Wilson, 226 N.J. Super. 271
(App.Div. 1988); State v. Smith, 226 N.J.Super. 276
(App. Div. 1988); State v. McCain, 150 N.J. Super. 497
(App. Div. 1977). Similarly, failure to participate in a
required drug rehabilitation program also constitutes
sufficient grounds to revoke probation. State v. Reyes, 207
N.J.Super. 126, 137 (App. Div. 1986), certif. denied 103
N.J. 499 (1986); State v. Johnson, 133 N.J. Super. 457,
464 (App. Div. 1975). Testing positive for drug use on
urine test is also grounds for revocation. State v. Smith,
226 N.J.Super. 276 (App. Div. 1988); State v. Wilson,
226 N.J.Super. 271 (App.Div. 1988).
Commission of a crime while on probation is
automatically a violation thereof and every probationer
must be held to know that, even where specific conditions
of probation may not have been prescribed. State v.
Williams, 299 N.J. Super. 264, 269 (App. Div. 1997);
State v. Zachowski, 53 N.J. Super. 431, 437 (App. Div.
1959). It is equally beyond question that a plea of guilty
or non-vult to a subsequent offense while on probation is
a conclusive admission and proof of violation. State v.
Williams, supra.
The penal code provides that no revocation of
suspension or probation shall be based on failure to pay
a fine or make restitution, unless the failure was willful.
N.J.S.A. 2C:45-3a(4).
A defendant may not be jailed merely because he
cannot pay a fine in full at once. State v. DeBonis, 58 N.J.
182, 196 (1971). See also Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395,
91 S.Ct. 668 (1971); Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235,
90 S.Ct. 2018 (1970). If a defendant is unable to pay a
fine or restitution at once, he shall upon a showing of that
inability, be afforded an opportunity to pay the fine or
restitution in reasonable installments consistent with the
objective of achieving the punishment the fine/
restitution was designed to inflict. State v. DeBonis, 58
N.J. at 199. If a defendant fails to meet the installments,
he shall be recalled for reconsideration of sentence. The
court may reduce the fine/restitution, or suspend it, or
modify the installment plan, or if none of those
alternatives is warranted, the court may imposed a jail
term to achieve the penological objective. N.J.S.A.
2C:46-2a; State v. DeBonis, 58 N.J. at 200.Where a fine was imposed on defendant as a
condition of his three year probationary term, the power
to collect the unpaid portion of the fine did not expire
with his probation, and the State could institute
summary collection proceedings under N.J.S.A. 2C:46-
2 after the probationary term ended. State v. Joseph, 238
N.J. Super. 219 (App. Div. 1990).A violation of probation may be based on hearsay
evidence. State v. Jenkins, 299 N.J. Super. at 74; State v.
Reyes, 207 N.J. Super. at 138-139.III. STATEMENTS TO PROBATION OFFIC-
ERS
State v. Generoso, 156 N.J. Super. 540 (App. Div.
1978), held a probationer was not entitled to be given
Miranda warnings prior to discussions with his probation
officer. The court held that Miranda was not applicable
to routine probation interviews between a probationer
and a probation officer and that the uncorroborated
admission of defendant was sufficient for a finding of
probation violation. Id. at 546-548.In Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct.
1136, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984), a defendant made
incriminating statements to his probation officer in
response to her questions concerning his involvement in
a murder. The Supreme Court upheld the admission of
the statements and found that statements made by a
probationer to his probation officer without prior
warnings are admissible in a subsequent criminal
proceeding. The court found that defendant was not “in
custody” for Miranda purposes and further held that the
general obligation of a probationer to appear before his
probation officer and answer questions truthfully did not
in itself convert a probationer’s otherwise voluntary
statements into compelled ones. 465 U.S. at 430-434,
104 S.Ct. at 1143-1145; see, In Re A.B., 278 N.J.Super.
380 (Ch. Div. 1994) (juvenile in JISP program was not
in custody for Miranda purposes when questioned by
JISP officer in his own home with parent present).State v. Johnson, 186 N.J. Super. 423 (App. Div.
1982), held that the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination is unavailable to a probationer at a
revocation hearing and that this deprivation did not
offend due process. Id. at 431. The court also held that