prosecutor should first apply to the court for a subpoena
duces tecum. State v. Weston, 216 N.J. Super. at 548.
Because of the significant public question involved, a
prosecutor has standing to bring a declaratory judgement
action to determine the proper allocation of
responsibilities between a local governing body and its
chief of police. Falcone v. DeFuria, 103 N.J. 219 (1986).
For purposes of the immunity clause of the New
Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:3-8, an extradition
proceeding is a “judicial proceeding.” Thus, a prosecutor
and assistant prosecutor are subject to immunity when
they instituted extradition proceedings against the
wrong persons, and there is no evidence in the case that
“their institution of extradition proceedings constitute[s]
a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful
misconduct.” Hayes v. Mercer County, 217 N.J. Super.
614 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 108 N.J. 643 (1987).
Generally, a prosecutor is prohibited from eliciting
admissions from a defendant concerning derogatory
statements made about blacks and from referring to
defendant’s racial attitude during summation. However,
when a defendant is being tried for racially motivated
crimes against a black family living in a white
neighborhood, the prosecutor’s conduct is permissible
since it proves defendant’s specific intent to do harm
against another because of race. State v. Davidson, 226
N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1988).
Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to compulsory
process was violated by state’s plea agreement not to seek
extended 50-year sentence in exchange for co-
defendant’s promise not to testify at defendant’s murder
trial. State v. Correa, 308 N.J. Super. 480, 484-87 (App.
Div. 1998)(The court ruled that such a plea was harmful
“because a court will seldom be able to determine exactly
what evidence would have been brought out had the
witness been allowed to testify freely.” Id. quoting from
State v. Asher, 861 P.2d 847 (1993)). See State v. Fort,
101 N.J. 123 (1985).
However, in State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 163-64
(1997), the Court ruled that the State’s plea agreement
with a murder co-defendant, conditioned upon the co-
defendant’s truthful cooperation and truthful testimony,
in which co-defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to
commit murder and escaped charge of capital murder,
did not violate defendant’s due process rights by
providing co-defendant with irresistible reasons to
provide perjured testimony against defendant. See also
State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 488-89 (1990)(defendant
was not denied due process or fair trial as result of witness
cooperation agreement between State and jailhouse
informant, considering disclosure of agreement to jury
during direct testimony, cross-examination, and jury
instructions); State v. Morant, 241 N.J. Super. 121, 141
(App. Div. 1990)(“... nothing unholy flows from the
cooperation of a defendant with the prosecutor, even
when that cooperation inures to the admissibility of
evidence against co-defendants, provided the admission
is proper and the State honors any agreement it makes.”)The prosecutor in a drug case had a duty to engage
in good faith diligence to ascertain whereabouts of the co-
defendant, who was a material witness, was living out of
state and was cooperating with authorities, so that the co-
defendant’s presence could be compelled. State v.
Farquharson, 280 N.J. Super. 239, 246-47 (App. Div.),
certif. denied, 142 N.J. 517 (1995).State v. Clark, 162 N.J. 201 (2000), precluded
municipal prosecutors from simultaneously serving as
defense counsel in superior court in the same county in
which the individual serves as municipal prosecutor. The
Supreme Court of New Jersey issued an order on May 3,
2000 which relaxed R. 1:15-5 to provide that the
limitations on municipal prosecutors imposed by State v.
Clark did not extend to partners, shareholders, associates,
employees, or members of a limited liability entity of a
municipal prosecutor (pending issuance of the final
report of the American Bar Association’s Commission on
the Evaluation of the Rules of Professional Conduct).