circumstances caused him/her to expect more danger from
this traffic stop than from other routine traffic stops. Id. at
619-20.
The police may conduct a weapons search of the
interior of a car when they have a reasonable belief that the
motorist is potentially dangerous. That belief must be
based upon specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from the facts, reasonably
warrant the officer in believing that the suspect is
dangerous and may gain immediate control of weapons.
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049, 103 S.Ct. 3469,
3480, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983); State v. Lund, 119 N.J. 35,
40 (1990). Even if there is an insufficient basis for a
protective search at the initial encounter between the
officer and suspect, events occurring after the stop might
give the police reasons to conduct a protective search for
weapons. Id. at 46. Furtive gestures and nervousness may,
in conjunction with other facts, be enough to justify a
protective search for weapons. Id. at 47; State v. Daniels,
264 N.J. Super. 161, 166 (App. Div. 1993) (court gives due
deference to the officer’s belief that defendant’s actions
were suspicions and his belief that, given lack of
documentation and false plates on car, the vehicle was
probably stolen).
- Automobile Exception
The “automobile exception” to the warrant require-
ment permits the police to search a car when they have
probable cause to believe it contains contraband or
evidence of criminal activity. State v. Colvin, 123 N.J. 428,
431 (1991). Historically, the exception was based on the
inherent mobility of automobiles, which create exigent
circumstances, and the lessened expectation of privacy in
automobiles. Id. However, in Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518
U.S. 938, 940, 116 S.Ct. 2485, 2487, 135 L.Ed.2d 1031
(1996), the United States Supreme Court determined that
if a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe
that the vehicle contains contraband, the Fourth
Amendment permits the police to conduct a search; a
showing of exigent circumstances is not required. The
New Jersey Supreme Court has rejected Labron on state
constitutional grounds and continued to require exigent
circumstances before the police can conduct a search
pursuant to the automobile exception. See State v. Cooke,
163 N.J. 657, 667-670 (2000).
Exigent circumstances include the unforseeability and
spontaneity of the circumstances giving rise to probable
cause and the inherent mobility of the automobile as well as
any element of surprise that has been lost, the fact that
confederates, who are not in custody are waiting to move
the evidence and the fact that police would need a special
detail to guard an immobilized vehicle. Id. at 18-19.The police cannot orchestrate the circumstances so
that an item is delivered to an automobile and then rely
upon the automobile exception to search the vehicle. State
v. Santiago, 319 N.J. Super. 632, 639-40 (App. Div. 1999).
The automobile exception applies whether the car is parked
or mobile. State v. Cooke, 163 N.J. at 657; State v. Esteves,
93 N.J. 498 (1983). The police can transport the vehicle to
another location and conduct a search without first
obtaining a search warrant. State v. Colvin, 123 N.J. at 433.A search of the automobile under this exception is
limited to those areas where the police have probable cause
to believe evidence of criminal activity can be found.
Probable cause to believe that a container in the car holds
contraband or evidence allows a warrantless search of that
item under the automobile exception even if probable
cause does not extend to the entire car. California v.
Acevado, 500 U.S. 565, 574, 111 S.Ct. 1982, 1988, 114
L.Ed.2d 619 (1991); State v. Lugo, 249 N.J. Super. 565,
568 (App. Div. 1991).- Search incident to arrest
If the police properly stop a vehicle and arrest the
occupant, the police have the authority to search the
passenger compartment and any containers in the area
irrespective of whether probable cause exists to believe
contraband is contained there. New York v. Belton, 453
U.S. 454, 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 2864, 69 L.Ed.2d 768
(1987). The Supreme Court has determined that Belton
does not apply to warrantless arrests for motor vehicle
offenses. State v. Pierce, 136 N.J. 184, 210-15 (1994). See
also Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 117-18, 119 S.Ct. 484,
488, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998) (constitution does not
permit police to conduct a full search of a vehicle after
giving driver citation for speeding).However, the police may search areas within the
immediate control of the arrestee, Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752, 762-63, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d 685
(1969), may search the person of the arrestee, State v.
Pierce, 136 N.J. at 213-14, and may conduct a weapons
search of the interior if they possess a reasonable belief that
the vehicle’s driver or passenger(s) pose a threat to their
safety, State v. Lund, 119 N.J. 35, 40 (1990).