illegality). The key question under the independent source
doctrine “is whether the State learned of the evidence from
an untainted source, not whether it gained possession of the
evidence from one.” State v. Curry, 109 N.J. at 14
(emphasis in original).
The independent source doctrine has two applica-
tions. The general application identifies all evidence
acquired in a fashion untainted by the illegal evidence-
gathering activity. This occurs when police gain access to
evidence wholly independent from the illegal activity, as,
for example when a third party reveals damaging
information. The more specific application of the rule
applies when evidence acquired through an independent
source is identical to the evidence unlawfully acquired. So
long as the police obtained that evidence from untainted
sources, it is considered cleanly obtained. Murray v. United
States, 487 U.S. 533, 537, 108 S.Ct. 2529, 2533, 101
L.Ed.2d 422 (1988). The Supreme Court has made clear
that reseizure of tangible evidence does not require a
different analysis. Because the police should not be placed
in a worse position due to their illegal activity, so long as the
later, lawful seizure is genuinely independent of the earlier,
illegal search, the independent source doctrine applies. To
decide whether a search warrant was based on a genuinely
independent source of the information, the court must
determine whether what the police originally illegally
obtained was presented in support of the probable cause
that prompted the trial judge to issue the warrant. See also
State v. Nichols, 253 N.J. Super. 273 (App. Div. 1992).
G. Inevitable Discovery
One of the exceptions to the exclusionary rule is the
inevitable discovery doctrine which posits that the
exclusion of evidence should not occur if the police would
have obtained the same evidence even if no misconduct
occurred. State v. Johnson, 120 N.J. 263, 289 (1990); State
v. Sugar III, 108 N.J. 151 (1987); State v. Sugar II, 100 N.J.
214 (1986). That is because the exclusionary rule is meant
to place the police in no worse condition than if the
unlawful conduct had not occurred. United States v.
Hernandez-Cano, 808 F.2d 779, 783 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 482 U.S. 918 (1987); State v. Nichols, 253 N.J.
Super. 273, 277 (App. Div. 1992). In order for inevitable
discovery to apply, the State must show by clear and
convincing evidence that 1) proper, normal and specific
investigative procedures would have been pursued in order
to complete the investigation of the case, 2) under all of the
surrounding relevant circumstances the pursuit of these
procedures inevitably would have resulted in the discovery
of the evidence and 3) the discovery of the evidence
through use of the procedures would have occurred wholly
independently of the discovery of such evidence by
unlawful means. State v. Sugar II, 100 N.J. at 235.The State need not demonstrate the exact circum-
stances of the evidence’s discovery or establish the exclusive
path leading to the discovery. It needs only to show that the
evidence ultimately would have been discovered. The facts
and elements underlying the inevitable discovery may be
proven only by a preponderance of the evidence so long as
the ultimate combination of facts and elements clearly and
convincingly establish that the evidence inevitably would
be discovered. State v. Sugar III, 108 N.J. at 159. The
doctrine applies where the disputed evidence inevitably
would have been discovered by a private party rather than
the police. United States v. Hernandez-Cano, 808 F.2d at
784; State v. Sugar III, 108 N.J. at 157; State v. Urcinoli,
321 N.J. Super. 519, 538-39 (App. Div. 1999) (evidence in
motel room inevitably would have been discovered by
motel employees).H. Plain View, Plain Smell, Plain Touch- Plain View
Where the police are lawfully in the area and
inadvertently see items suggesting criminal activity, they
may seize the items in plain view. State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J.
210, 236 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1030 (1984). The
inadvertence requirement of plain view is to prevent the
police from engaging in planned warrantless searches when
they know in advance the location of certain evidence.
Inadvertence is not defeated if the police had no intention
of seizing the evidence when they lawfully go to the place
where the evidence is located. State v. Damplias, 282 N.J.
Super. 471, 478-79 (App. Div. 1995).The federal plain view doctrine does not require that
police inadvertently view the object. Minnesota v.
Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 2137, 124
L.Ed.2d 334 (1993); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 107
S.Ct. 1149, 94 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987); Horton v. California,
496 U.S. 128, 136, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2310, 110 L.Ed.2d 112
(1990). The New Jersey courts have not determined
whether the inadvertence requirement remains a part of the
plain view search criteria. State v. Damplias, supra.If the item in plain view is not readily recognizable as
contraband, the police may not take any action, such as
lifting the object, which would reveal whether it was stolen
or not. Arizona v. Hicks, supra. In those circumstances, the
police must seek a warrant for further inspection. Id. A
bulge in an unusual area, such as the crotch or ankles, may
bolster a claim that the item seized was immediately