SELF-INCRIMINATIONSELF-INCRIMINATIONSELF-INCRIMINATIONSELF-INCRIMINATIONSELF-INCRIMINATION
(See also, COURTS, SIXTH AMENDMENT,
JUVENILES, IMMUNITY, AND
EVIDENCE, this Digest)
I. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON
INTERROGATIONS
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the
United States Constitution have been construed to impose
strictures on the manner in which law enforcement officials
conduct the interview of suspects during the investigatory
phase of the criminal process. However, it is the Fifth
Amendment, which guarantees that “no person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be witness against himself
... ” and its New Jersey counterpart, which remains the
touchstone for constitutional analysis of interrogations.
A. Miranda Generally
Prior to the watershed Miranda decision, the
admissibility of a confession was determined exclusively
under the fact-sensitive “totality of circumstances” test to
ascertain whether the challenged police conduct deprived
the defendant of his “power of resistence” in violation of
due process under the Fourteen Amendment. See Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 276 (1936). To be certain, the
voluntariness of a confession remains a necessary
precondition to the admissibility of statements obtained
through custodial questioning by law enforcement officers.
However, in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),
the United States Supreme Court supplanted the foregoing
test as the principal constitutional basis governing the
admissibility of confessions. Specifically, in Miranda the
Court extended the right against compelled self-
incrimination to encompass all custodial police interroga-
tions, a practice it perceived as presumptively coercive. To
dispel the inherently coercive atmosphere of a custodial
interrogation and thereby protect the suspect’s Fifth
Amendment rights, the Court enunciated specific
procedural safeguards which must be scrupulously adhered
to at all stages of a custodial interrogation. Of greatest
significance, a defendant must be warned prior to any
questioning of the following: 1) that he has the right to
remain silent; 2) that anything he says can be used against
him in a court of law; 3) that he has the right to the presence
of an attorney; and 4) that if he cannot afford an attorney
one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he
so desires.The failure to inform a criminal suspect of these
warnings gives rise to an irrebutable presumption that the
subsequent confession was involuntary, rendering it
inadmissible as substantive evidence of guilt. Conversely, a
statement will be deemed admissible only after the
prosecution has demonstrated a knowing, voluntary, and
intelligent waiver of these rights.The opinion explains further that if, at any stage of the
interrogation, the suspect indicates that he wishes to speak
with a lawyer, all questioning must cease. Even if the
suspect has answered some questions or volunteered a
statement, he may refuse to answer further questions until
he sees an attorney and therefore consents to be questioned.In Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 120 S.Ct.
2326, 147 L.Ed.2d 405 (2000), the United States Supreme
Court reaffirmed the constitutional vitality of its decision
in Miranda. Specifically, the Court held that Miranda,
being a constitutional decision, could not be effectively
overruled by an Act of Congress. It further held that the
principle of stare decisis militated heavily against overruling
Miranda, which, the Court observed, “has become
embedded in routine police practice to the point where the
warnings have become part of our natural culture.”
Although the Miranda opinion refers to custodial
interrogations conducted exclusively by “law enforcement
officers,” that term has since been broadly interpreted to
include caseworkers with the New Jersey Division of Youth
and Family Services, State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86 (1997); State
v. Helewa, 223 N.J. Super. 40 (App, Div. 1988), Internal
Revenue Service agents, Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1
(1968), and court-appointed psychiatrists, Estelle v. Smith,
451 U.S. 454 (1981). However, in State v. Biancamano,
284 N.J. Super. 654 (App. Div. 1995), certif. denied, 143
N.J. 516 (1996). the Appellate Division rejected the
assertion that a high school vice-principal was acting in the
capacity of a law enforcement officer when questioning a
student about drugs allegedly sold by him.Lastly, the United States Supreme Court in Berkemer v.
McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984), decisively rejected the
existence of a “minor crimes” exception to the Miranda
requirement. The holding was premised on the Court’s
view that to grant an exemption from Miranda for minor
crimes would substantially undermine the clarity of the
Miranda rule.