6b, failure to recite the statutory formula will not defeat
sentence imposed. Id.
Parole ineligibility term must be on a specific sentence
or specific count of indictment; it cannot be imposed on
aggregate sentence. State v. Orlando, 269 N.J. Super. 116,
141 (App. Div. 1993), certif. denied 136 N.J. 30 (1994);
State v. Subin, 222 N.J. Super. 227, 241 (App. Div.), certif.
denied 111 N.J. 580 (1988); State v. Alevas, 213 N.J. Super.
331, 342 (App. Div. 1986); State v. Jones, 213 N.J. Super.
562, 571 (App. Div. 1986).
Commutation and work credits are not deducted from
parole ineligibility terms but are awarded after the prisoner
has served the mandatory minimum sentence. Merola v.
Department of Corrections, 285 N.J. Super. 501, 512 (App.
Div. 1995), certif. denied 143 N.J. 519 (1996); Karatz v.
Scheidemantel, 226 N.J. Super. 468 (App. Div. 1988);
N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51(a).
Gap-time credits do not reduce parole ineligibility
terms. Booker v. New Jersey State Parole Bd., 136 N.J. 257,
263 (1994); Mitnaul v. New Jersey Parole Board, 280 N.J.
Super. 164 (App. Div. 1995).
Mandatory minimum 30 year parole ineligibility term
for murder is not reduced by commutation and work
credits. Merola v. Department of Corrections, 285 N.J.
Super. 501 (App. Div. 1995), certif. denied 143 N.J. 519
(1996).
There is no constitutional impediment barring
imposition of the mandatory 30 year sentence on juveniles
whose cases have been waived to the adult court and who
have been found guilty of murder. State v. Pratt, 226 N.J.
Super. 307 (App. Div.), certif. denied 114 N.J. 314 (1988).
Parole ineligibility terms may be imposed on any
crime, including CDS offenses. State v. Reevey, 213 N.J.
Super. 37 (App. Div. 1986); State v. Flippin, 208 N.J.
Super. 573, 576 (App. Div. 1986).
In State v. Towey, 114 N.J. 69 (1989), the Supreme
Court held that there should be a high degree of correlation
between the length of the base term and the length of the
parole ineligibility term. State v. Towey, 114 N.J. at 81. It
is logical to expect that the longest parole ineligibility term
would be imposed only on base terms at or near the top of
the range for the degree of crime involved. Id.
Increasing presumptive term is not prerequisite for
imposition of parole ineligibility, and sentencing court
should not increase presumptive term merely to justify
period of parole ineligibility. State v. Kruse, 105 N.J. at
362.When parties have entered plea agreement limiting
maximum sentence to presumptive term, court may
sentence defendant to such term subject to period of parole
ineligibility. State v. Kruse, 105 N.J. at 361-362.
Nevertheless, it will be a rare case in which the sentencing
court imposes a period of parole ineligibility on top of a
presumptive sentence. Id. at 362.In State v. Bowens, 108 N.J. 622 (1987), the Supreme
Court upheld the imposition of a five year parole
ineligibility period on a presumptive 15 year sentence for
first degree aggravated manslaughter. The Court found
that the sentence imposed was appropriate under Kruse
because the trial court explained the reasons that
harmonize a presumed ordinary term with a period of
parole ineligibility.Generally, a sentencing court cannot impose sentence
at bottom range for third degree offense with a parole
ineligibility term because imposition of less than
presumptive term required fact-finding inconsistent with
that necessary for imposition of period of parole
ineligibility term. State v. Alevas, 213 N.J. Super. at 342.
Compare, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1f with N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6b. See,
e.g., State v. Nemeth, 214 N.J. Super. 324 (App. Div. 1986).However, a parole ineligibility term may be legally
imposed on sentence lesser than the presumptive term
where the defendant acknowledged at the time of the plea
proceedings that a parole ineligibility term could be
imposed notwithstanding imposition of a sentence at the
bottom of the sentencing range, and the trial court stated
that it was clearly convinced that the aggravating factors
substantially outweighed the mitigating ones and the
sentence imposed comported fully with the plea
agreement. State v. Cullars, 224 N.J. Super. 32, 43 (App.
Div.), certif. denied 111 N.J. 605 (1988). See also State v.
Guzman, 199 N.J. Super. 346 (Law Div. 1985).A 25 year parole disqualifier can be imposed on a life
sentence for a Title 24 drug offense. State v. Cacamis, 230
N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1988), certif. denied 114 N.J. 496
(1989).