factors relating to criminal history, even if such offenses
would not themselves require registration.
In In re E.I., 300 N.J. 519 (App. Div., 1997), the
Appellate Division found that in “unusual cases” the facts
presented during the hearing will necessitate the trial court
classifying the registrant one tier lower than the RRAS
requires The Court found that this case presented one of
those “unusual cases”. In this case facts were presented to
the trial court that showed that this registrant was not the
type of offender that was contemplated by the community
notification provisions of Megan’s Law. These facts were:
(1) there was no evidence that the registrant was a sexual
predator; (2) there was no evidence that the registrant used
violence to accomplish the sexual assault; (3) there was no
evidence that the registrant was likely to reoffend; and (4)
the community notification would have a negative affect
on the registrant’s rehabilitation, which was part of the
registrant’s sentence. See Matter of A.I., 303 N.J. Super.
105 (App. Div. 1997) (also upholding the classification of
such a registrant)
In In re R.F., 317 N.J. Super. 379 (App. Div., 1998),
certif. granted and summarily remanded 162 N.J. 123
(1999), the Appellate Division found that the prosecutor
has the burden to present “clear and convincing evidence”
to support the scope of notification which the prosecutor
feels is necessary to protect the members of the community
who will come into contact with the registrant.
In In re E.A., 285 N.J. Super. 554 (App. Div., 1995),
the Appellate Division clarified the scope of notification.
The Court found that notification made within a one mile
and one-half radius of the registrant’s address in a suburban
or rural area is appropriate. Furthermore, the Court
directed the prosecutor to prepare a “grid, color-coded,
large scale map of the county to identify the low-,
moderate, and high population density areas on a
municipality-by-municipality basis.” These maps are to be
utilized in determining the scope of notification.
In Matter of E.D., 288 N.J. Super. 166 (App. Div.
1996), the Appellate Division held that although the
statute uses place of residence as the basis for the
registration requirement, a person living out of the state but
working in state can be required to register.
In State in Interest of B.G., 289 N.J. Super. 361 (App.
Div.), certif. denied 145 N.J. 374 (1996), the Appellate
Division held that the registration requirements clearly
apply to juveniles, and they do not terminate when a
juvenile turns eighteen. But see, State in Interest of J.G., 165
N.J. 602 (2000) (issue of applicability to juveniles currently
pending in New Jersey Supreme Court); see also, State in
Interest of K.B., 304 N.J. Super. 628 (App. Div. 1997)
(court did not rule on how registration requirements would
be affected by a juvenile asserting exemption from the
statutory disclosure requirements of N.J.S.A. 2A:4A-60f
because the juvenile had failed to satisfy the non-disclosure
requirements).