Although N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6f tolls the limitation for
prosecution of crimes, it neither sets a limit for
commencement of a probation violation proceeding nor
provides for tolling of any such limitation. State v.
DeChristino, 235 N.J. Super. 291, 296 (App. Div. 1989)
(violation proceedings commenced too late, flight did
not toll limitation).
Factors to be considered in determining whether
welfare fraud is a continuing offense and thus unshielded
by N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6 limitation provisions include time
gaps separating the periods of improper welfare
payments. State v. Kern, 325 N.J. Super. 435, 445 (App.
Div. 1999). The crime of “bail jumping,” N.J.S.A.
2C:29-7, is not a continuing offense, but the “flight from
justice” tolling provision of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6f may apply,
depending on the facts of the case. State v. Meltzer, 239
N.J. Super. 110 (Law Div. 1989).
Unless otherwise provided in the Code, no civil
action shall be brought pursuant to the Code more than
five years after the cause of action accrues. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-
6g. The Code creates civil causes of action for theft
violations, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-20 and -21, racketeering
violations, N.J.S.A. 2C:41-4, money laundering,
N.J.S.A. 2C:21-28, and forfeiture, N.J.S.A. 2C:64-1 et
seq., provided, however, that a forfeiture action must be
commenced within ninety days of seizure if seized
property is sought in a forfeiture action. N.J.S.A. 2C:64-
3a.
One New Jersey court, noting that it did not decide
the applicability of N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6g, has held, by
analogy to federal limitations analysis, that a four-year
limitation period applies to civil racketeering actions
brought pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:41-1 et seq. Matter of
Integrity Ins. Co., 245 N.J. Super. 133 (Law Div. 1990).
The Appellate Division saw no need to decide whether a
four- or five-year limitation applied in Fraser v. Bovino,
317 N.J. Super. 23, 34 (App. Div. 1998), because the
civil racketeering complaint was filed outside both
periods of limitation.
The defense of the statute of limitations should not
be raised as a pretrial matter. Rather, it should be raised
as a question of law by motion for judgment of acquittal
at the end of the State’s case if the State has failed to
produce evidence that defendant was a fugitive. If the
State produces evidence of flight, however, the
determination of the fugitive status becomes a question
of fact for the jury. State v. Ochmanski, 216 N.J. Super.
240 (Law Div. 1987).
Defendant Ochmanski was charged with murder in
a 1980 indictment, and subsequently was charged with
two counts of murder, conspiracy, and kidnaping in a
1986 superseding indictment. There were no
limitations on the murder charges, N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6a, and
the limitation for the conspiracy charge was tolled
because it subjected defendant to prosecution for the
“same conduct,” N.J.S.A. 2C:1-6e, that was the subject
of charges against defendant in the original indictment
for murder. N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8a(2)d. The five-year statute
of limitations for kidnaping, however, which did not
involve the same conduct as murder, would run, unless
the State could prove that defendant was a fugitive. State
v. Ochamski, supra.The statute of limitations creates rights that
generally are not waived with respect to lesser included
offenses. State v. Short, 131 N.J. 47, 54-57 (1993). For
example, in a murder prosecution where a lesser included
manslaughter offense was subject to a then five-year
limitation which barred a manslaughter conviction, the
jury should have been instructed on manslaughter but
not told that defendant would go free if found guilty of
manslaughter. Id.