State v. Stewart, 136 N.J. 174 (1994). Non-
legislative, court-administered probation programs may
not be operated in a manner that conflicts with explicit
legislative intent. The Court determined that the trial
court improperly admitted a defendant into an Intensive
Supervision Program, because N.J.S.A. 2C:35-12
expressly prohibits a court from imposing a lesser
punishment than agreed to in the plea bargain. As such,
defendant was ordered to return to jail to complete the
imprisonment imposed as part of a probationary term.
State v. Bigham, 119 N.J. 146 (1990). The Insurance
Reform Act, N.J.S.A. 17:29A-35b(3), authorized the
Director of the Department of Motor Vehicles to impose
a surcharge on a motorist convicted of motor vehicle
violations for offenses which pose a direct threat to safety
even if points are not assessed for these offenses.
State v. Churchdale Leasing, Inc., 115 N.J. 83 (1989),
held that the State violated the double jeopardy clause of
the federal constitution by imposing punishments on
operators of commercial vehicles for both vehicle
registration violations and excess weight violations arising
from the operation of commercial vehicles in excess of
maximum registered weight. Since there was an absence
of any clear expression of legislative intent, the State was
limited to recovery of penalties for one violation or the
other, but not both.
State v. Wright, 107 N.J. 488 (1987). Conviction for
refusal to take a Breathalyzer examination in violation of
N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4 is not conditioned upon actual
operation of a motor vehicle. The Supreme Court
reached this conclusion after examining not only the
particular statute involved, but the entire legislative
scheme. The Court noted that a broad interpretation
should be given to the drunk driving laws where a narrow
interpretation would frustrate legislative intent.
According to the Supreme Court, the legislative history
of the consent and refusal statutes, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.2
and 50.4, clearly indicated that they were enacted to
facilitate drunk driving investigations and that a
requirement of actual operation was inconsistent with
that purpose.
State v. Tate, 102 N.J. 64 (1986). The legislative
intent to preclude a defendant charged with possession of
marijuana who alleges need of the drug for relief from
spasticity associated with his quadriplegia from using the
statutory defense of justification, N.J.S.A. 2C:3-2a, was
clear from the statutory language permitting possession
of marijuana pursuant to a valid prescription.
In State v. McGague, 314 N.J. Super. 254, 263 (App.
Div. 1998), certif. denied, 157 N.J. 542 (1998),
defendants’ convictions for possession or distribution of
hypodermic needles, N.J.S.A. 26:36-6, were affirmed as
the Appellate Division rejected defendants’ claim that
their actions were justified by the medical necessity to
prevent the spread of AIDS.Fisher v. State Parole Board, 303 N.J. Super. 229 (App.
Div. 1997), aff’d o.b., 154 N.J. 85 (1998). Statute which
requires prisoners to pay a portion of appellate filing fee,
N.J.S.A. 30:4-16.2, was intended to prevent frivolous
lawsuits and is inapplicable to inmate appeals from
agency decisions in parole and disciplinary matters.State v. Nutter, 258 N.J. Super. 41 (App. Div. 1992).
Statute allowing child to testify via closed circuit
television in sexual assault prosecutions, N.J.S.A.
2A:84A-32.4, cannot be employed in murder
prosecutions.State v. Wrotny, 221 N.J. Super. 226 (App. Div.
1987). The language of a statute should be construed in
such a manner as to preclude an absurd result. Since the
primary purpose of N.J.S.A. 39:3-40e was to deter people
whose driver’s licenses had been suspended or revoked
from driving, the provisions of N.J.S.A. 39:3-40 could
not be construed in such a manner that one previously
convicted of a drunk driving offense would be treated
more leniently than one not previously convicted. (See
also, MOTOR VEHICLES, this Digest).Matter of Scioscia, 216 N.J. Super. 644 (App. Div.
1987).Since legislation which is susceptible to differing
interpretations should be interpreted in accordance with
its underlying objective, the court examined the
underlying purposes of the Solid Waste Utility Control
Act, N.J.S.A. 48:13A-10a, and the regulations adopted
in conjunction with the Act in determining whether its
antimonopoly provisions prohibited various activities
not expressly mentioned in the Act. The court concluded
from its review that on the basis of either the underlying
purpose of the Act or the adopted regulations it was clear
that these activities were prohibited.State v. Walker, 216 N.J. Super. 39 (App. Div. 1987).
In light of the legislative purposes and consistent with the
plain meaning of the language used, the court defined
“incapacitating mental anguish” as used in N.J.S.A.
2C:14-2c(1) to mean severe emotional distress resulting
in a temporary incapacity which is more than a “mere