understanding in creating crime, Court should explain
and more fully define statutory language. The Court
applied this concept to the “drug kingpin” statute,
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-3, and reversed defendant’s conviction
because the jury charge was faulty.
State v. Purnell, 126 N.J. 518 (1992). Even if offense
does not meet penal code’s definition of lesser-included
offense under N.J.S.A. 2C:1-8d, a lesser offense
supported by the evidence should be submitted to the
jury. Using that criteria, the Court held that it was
reversible error in this death penalty case not to charge the
jury on felony murder as a lesser offense of purposeful
murder.
State v. Sloane, 111 N.J. 293 (1988). Statutory
categories of lesser-included offense are not “water-tight”
compartments. Therefore, where the relative culpability
of an offender can be mitigated by the presence of other
evidentiary factors and defendant is on fair notice, the
trial judge should submit lesser offenses to the jury to
resolve the issue of defendant’s culpability.
State v. Miller, 108 N.J. 112 (1987). The grading of
sexual crimes that occur within the family differently
from those occurring in other contexts demonstrates the
Legislature’s intent to distinguish sexual assault on
children committed by strangers from those committed
by persons with a legal duty to care for a child. The
Supreme Court concluded that defendant-father’s
convictions for aggravated sexual assault and endangering
the welfare of a child did not merge even though both
were based upon the same conduct because the latter
offenses also entailed a breach of parental duty. (See also,
MERGER, this Digest).
State v. Harmon, 104 N.J. 189 (1986). The structure
of Chapter 39 evinces the Legislature’s intent that the
offense of possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose,
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a, requires a more culpable state of
mind than that required for conviction under the
regulatory sections of Chapter 39. The fact that N.J.S.A.
2C:39-4a is grouped with the regulatory weapons
offenses does not negate the fact that a defendant’s state
of mind is critical in determining guilt or innocence and
convictions may ensue only when it has been determined
that the defendant has armed himself with the actual
purpose of using the weapon in a criminal manner against
another. The Court found this view to be consistent with
the plain meaning of the applicable Code provisions and
the framework of Chapter 39.
State v. A.N.J., 98 N.J. 421 (1985). The plain
language and legislative history of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-3
permits expungement of more than one disorderly
persons offense. When the plain language of the code
presents apparent inconsistencies, the court should seek
interpretations that most appropriately reflect the
Legislature’s intent. Despite general language limiting
expungement to “one-time offenders,” N.J.S.A. 2C:52-
32, the court emphasized that N.J.S.A. 2C:52-3
expressly set forth procedures to expunge a disorderly
persons offense, five years after the date of the conviction,
if the defendant has committed no more than three
disorderly persons offenses. In contrast, the statute
allowed expungement of only one criminal conviction.State v. 1979 Pontiac Trans Am, Color Grey, 98 N.J.
474 (1985). The Supreme Court construed parts of the
code’s forfeiture statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:64-1 to N.J.S.A.
2C:64-5, to allow innocent owners of unlawfully used
property to claim as a defense that they did all that could
be reasonably expected to prevent the unlawful use of the
property. Forfeiture statutes are to be construed strictly
and in a manner favorable to the individual whose
property is seized. Permitting innocent property owners
to assert the defense shelters the statute from a
constitutional attack on the ground that it represents an
unlawful taking of property without just compensation
in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause.
Moreover, the statute, read in its entirety, reflects the
legislature’s intention to weigh absence of knowledge of
the property’s unlawful use before declaring forfeiture of
the property. N.J.S.A. 2C:64-5; N.J.S.A. 2C:64-8.
Accord, State v. One 1979 Pontiac Sunbird, 191 N.J. Super.
578 (App. Div. 1983); see also State v. One 1990 Honda
Accord, 154 N.J. 373, 378-79 (1998) (forfeiture is a
disfavored remedy, depends on statute for existence and
remains subject to common law principles, including
right to jury trial).State v N.W., 329 N.J. Super. 326 (App. Div. 2000).
The expungement statute, N.J.S.A. 2C:52-2b, which
specifically bars expungement of the pre-code offense of
rape, does not bar expungement of pre-code offense of
carnal abuse.State v. Battle, 256 N.J. Super. 268 (App. Div. 1992),
certif. denied, 130 N.J. 393 (1992). Although resisting
arrest is not lesser included offense of escape, defendant’s
conviction for resisting arrest was affirmed because there
was evidence in the record to support it and defendant
requested that the trial court charge it.