intoxicated, is not limited to a per se 24-hour period. The
language of N.J.S.A. 5:12-1 to 210 codifies this
common-law right. This opinion limits the scope of the
opinion in State v. Morse, 276 N.J. Super. 129 (Law Div.
1994).
II. DAMAGING TANGIBLE PROPERTY
A. Scope of the Offense
- Elements of damaging tangible property under
N.J.S.A. 2C:18-5:
a. Knowingly or recklessly;
b. Damaging tangible property, including any
fence, building, feedstocks, crops, trees, or animals;
c. On the lands of another;
d. Without obtaining written permission of the
owner, occupant or lessee of the lands and possessing such
written permission while traversing the land.
- Definitions
a. Land is defined as any agricultural field devoted to
the production of plants and animals for sale or any field
in agricultural use where public notice prohibiting
trespass is given by actual communication, posting, or
fencing. N.J.S.A. 2C:18-4.
- Grading of the offense depends upon the amount
of pecuniary damage to the property. N.J.S.A. 2C:18-6.
UNIFORM ACT TO SECURE THEUNIFORM ACT TO SECURE THEUNIFORM ACT TO SECURE THEUNIFORM ACT TO SECURE THEUNIFORM ACT TO SECURE THE
ATTENDANCE OF WITNESSESATTENDANCE OF WITNESSESATTENDANCE OF WITNESSESATTENDANCE OF WITNESSESATTENDANCE OF WITNESSES
I. PURPOSE OF THE ACT
The Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of
Witnesses (N.J.S.A. 2A:81-18 to 23) provides a
procedure whereby a resident of New Jersey may be
compelled to appear as a witness in a criminal prosecution
in another jurisdiction and a non-resident may be
compelled to appear as a witness in a New Jersey criminal
prosecution. In re Saperstein, 30 N.J.Super. 373, 379-80
(App. Div.), certif. denied, 15 N.J. 613 , cert. denied, 348
U.S. 874 (1954); see Silverman v. Berkson, 140 N.J. 412,
426 , cert. denied, 516 U.S. 975 (1995). The underlying
belief is that the law is entitled to every person’s evidence.
State v. Roman, 248 N.J.Super. 144, 150 (App. Div.
1991).
All 50 States as well as the District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands have enacted the
Uniform Act. It is to be construed liberally to achieve its
aims. In re State Grand Jury Investigation into Corrup. in
Lindenwold, 136 N.J.Super. 163, 169 (App. Div. 1975).
II. SCOPE AND OPERATION OF THE ACT
The remedy of compulsory process under the Act’s
provisions is equally available to the State and defendant.
In re Cooper, 127 N.J.L. 312 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
A determination that a witness is “material and
necessary,” that his or her production will not cause
“undue hardship,” and that the laws of the requesting
state and states through which he or she must pass en
route grant immunity from “arrest and the service of civil
and criminal process,” are prerequisites to issuing the
summons. N.J.S.A. 2C:81-19; New York v. O’Neill, 359
U.S. 1, 4 (1959); In re Cooper, 127 N.J.L. at 313. A
witness also can be “material” for grand jury purposes. See
In re State Grand Jury Investigation, 242 N.J.Super. 281,
286-87 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 127 N.J. 324 (1990).
The burden of proof that a witness is “material and
necessary” rests upon the party seeking the testimony of
that witness. State v. Smith, 87 N.J.Super. 98, 103 (App.
Div. 1965).
The Act may be used to compel the production of
documents as well as testimony. In In re Saperstein, supra,
a New Jersey resident directed to appear as a witness in a
criminal proceeding in New York objected to that
portion of the order requiring him to produce books and