license and registration are improper under the Fourth
Amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct.
1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); State v. Zapata, 297 N.J.
Super. 160 (App. Div. 1997), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 405
(1998). A motor vehicle stop is always justified where the
police have probable cause to believe that the motorist has
violated the law. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806,
817, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89, 100 (1996) (in
high drug area, plain clothes police in unmarked car
observed youthful driver in new car with temporary
plates driving at unreasonable speed); State v. Dickey, 152
N.J. 468, 475-76 (1998) (driving thirty four miles per
hour on interstate in middle lane, driver had blood shot
eyes, trembling hands, could not produce insurance or
car registration, could not say who car belonged to or
where he was coming from); State v. Donis, 157 N.J. at
44 (police may use “mobile data terminal” to inquire
about motorist’s license plate number, before police
observe motor vehicle violation). But see State v. Lark, 163
N.J. 294, 296 (2000) (driving without a license is
insufficient grounds for custodial arrest).
The individual states, however, are not precluded
from developing procedures for spot checks that are not
totally discretionary. Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz,
496 U.S. 444, 110 S.Ct. 2481, 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990)
(following a balancing test, the Court upheld DWI
roadblock briefly stopping each vehicle as minimal
intrusion versus state interest to prevent drunk driving).
Sobriety roadblocks are valid if properly put in place.
State v. Mazurek, 237 N.J. Super. 231, 238 (App. Div.
1989), certif. denied, 121 N.J. 623 (1990) (following
balancing test, DWI check point was a properly targeted
location that was efficacious). (See also, SEARCH and
SEIZURE this Digest.)
If a motorist is stopped for a suspected traffic
violation, an officer may request that the driver exit the
vehicle as a safety precaution. Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1997);
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 117 S.Ct. 882, 137
L.Ed.2d 41 (1997); State v. Smith, 134 N.J. 599 (1994);
State v. Lund, 119 N.J. at 35.
If an officer has a reasonable suspicion based upon
specific articulable facts that a vehicle is occupied by
illegal aliens, he may stop the vehicle, question its
occupants about their citizenship and immigration
status and ask them to explain suspicious circumstances.
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881, 95
S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). Further detention
must be based upon consent or probable cause that
criminal activity is afoot.In certain cases, police may stop a vehicle based on an
informant’s tip. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325,
110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990) (corroborated,
anonymous tip could justify investigatory stop of
vehicle); State v. Williams, 317 N.J. Super. 149 (App. Div.
1998), certif. denied, 157 N.J. 647 (1999) (stop of vehicle
upheld based on known citizen tip that defendants had
a gun).In some circumstances, the police may stop a car
under the police’s community caretaking function. State
v. Cryan, 320 N.J. Super. 325 (App. Div. 1999) (slow
driving insufficient suspicion to justify stop); State v.
Martinez, 260 N.J. Super. 75 (App. Div. 1992) (slow
driving at 2:00 a.m. in residential neighborhood justified
stop).C. Investigatory Detention
While a stop may be lawful, the length of the period
of detention may transform the stop into an illegal
detention. Whether the period of detention is reasonable
depends upon whether it was “reasonably related in scope
to the circumstances which justified the interference in
the first place.” State v. Dickey, 152 N.J. at 476
(quotation omitted). There is no hard and fast rule
governing length of time. United States v. Sharpe, 470
U.S. 675, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985); State
v. Dickey, 152 N.J. at 476. The detention must be no
more than necessary and must be only minimally
intrusive. State v. Dickey, 152 N.J. at 478.The reasonableness of the investigative detention
itself depends upon “a balance between the public
interest and the individual’s right to personal security
free from arbitrary interference by law officers.” Brown v.
Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 50, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357,
361 (1979).1. Police Station
In the absence of probable cause or an arrest warrant
an individual may not be detained at the police station for
the purposes of custodial interrogation. Dunaway v. New
York, 442 U.S. 200, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824
(1979) (seizure of suspect who was involuntarily taken to
police station was indistinguishable from an arrest and
required probable cause and not just reasonable
suspicion); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct.