This subsection imposes strict liability for anyone
convicted of violating N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1 which resulted in
bodily injury to any emergency services personnel.
N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(8) constitutes a crime of the third
degree if the victim suffers bodily injury, and is a crime
of the second degree if the victim suffers significant bodily
injury or serious bodily injury.
(9) A person is guilty of third degree aggravated
assault if he knowingly, under circumstances manifesting
extreme indifference to human life, points or displays a
firearm at or in the direction of a law enforcement officer,
N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(9).
(10) A person is guilty of third degree aggravated
assault, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(10), if he
knowingly points, displays or uses an imitation firearm at
a law enforcement officer with the purpose to intimidate,
threaten or attempt to put the officer in fear of bodily
injury or for any unlawful purpose.
(11) A person is guilty of third degree aggravated
assault, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1b(11) if he uses or
activates a laser sighting system or device or a system/
device which would cause a reasonable person to believe
that it is a laser sighting system/device at a law
enforcement officer acting in the performance of his
duties while in uniform or exhibiting evidence of
authority.
Laser sighting system or device means any system or
device that is integrated with or affixed to a firearm and
emits a laser light beam that is used to assist in the sight
alignment or arming of a firearm.
A person is guilty of assault by auto or vessel,
pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1c, if he drives a vehicle or
vessel recklessly and causes either serious bodily injury or
bodily injury to another. “Vessel” is defined as a means
of conveyance for travel on water and propelled otherwise
than by muscular power.
Assault by auto or vessel is a crime of the second
degree if serious bodily injury results from the defendant
operating the auto or vessel while in violation of N.J.S.A.
39:4-50 or N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a while on school property
used for school purposes owned or leased to any
elementary or secondary school or school board or within
1,000 feet of such school property; or while driving
through a school crossing (N.J.S.A. 39:1-1) designated as
such by a municipal ordinance or resolution; or driving
through a school crossing knowing that juveniles are
present.Assault by auto or vessel is a crime of the third degree
if the person drives the vehicle or vessel recklessly and
causes either serious bodily injury or bodily injury to
another or if the person drives the vehicle while in
violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 or 39:4-50.4a and serious
bodily injury results. It is a crime of the fourth degree of
serious bodily results or if the person drives the car while
in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50 or 39:4-50.4a and bodily
injury results. It is a disorderly persons offense if bodily
injury results.N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1c constitutes a crime of the fourth
degree if serious bodily injury results, and is a disorderly
persons offense if bodily injury results.
In State v. Kromphold, 162 N.J. 345 (2000), the
Supreme Court held that the trial court properly
instructed the jury that they could consider defendant’s
level of intoxication as evidence of recklessness, but erred
in double counting the level of intoxication as an
aggravating factor.State v. Caliguiri, 305 N.J. Super. 9 (App. Div.), aff’d
and modified, 158 N.J. 28 (1997), held that a
prosecutor’s categorical denial of entry into the Pre-Trial
Intervention Program (PTI) based upon assaults by
automobiles involving alcohol, rather than consideration
of relevant, case specific factors, was a patent mistaken
exercise of discretion and offended the PTI Guidelines.In State v. Kotter, 271 N.J. Super. 214 (App. Div.),
certif. denied,, 137 N.J. 313 (1994), the court held that
evidence in furtherance of defendant’s diminished
capacity was properly excluded when defendant was
charged only with crimes involving reckless culpability,
including assault by auto.A defendant’s drunken state may be used as evidence
of his reckless driving. Drunk driving does not necessarily
equate with reckless driving but it is a circumstance to be
considered by the jury. State v. Labrutto, 114 N.J. 187
(1989).A person is guilty of fourth degree assault, pursuant
to N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1d, if he is employed by a facility
defined in P.L. 1977, c.239 (C.52:27G-2) and commits
a simple assault as defined in paragraph (1) or (2) in
subsection a. of this statute upon an institutionalized