A History of India, Third Edition

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE MUGHAL EMPIRE

But Shah Jahan was not satisfied with setting the style for India, he also
wanted the old Mughal dream to come true: the recovery of Samarkand. A
clever diplomat as well as a great warrior, he was able to deprive the
Persians once more of Kandahar and yet retain them as his allies who
covered his flank when he embarked on the great northwestern campaign
against the Usbeks, their common enemy. Shah Jahan’s son Prince
Aurangzeb conquered the distant city of Balkh during this campaign, but
was then forced to retreat and found himself unable to recapture Kandahar
from the Persians, who had snatched it away in the meantime when they
saw that the Mughals had not succeeded in their great endeavour.
Kandahar was lost for ever and Samarkand was not recovered.
This remained a good lesson for Aurangzeb, who turned his attention to
the south and gave up all vain ambitions to go to the north once he ascended
the throne. According to established precedent he rebelled against his father.
He imprisoned him and set out to give a new orientation to the policy of
conquest. He had been viceroy of the Deccan before embarking on the futile
northwestern campaign. Once he had seized power, he tried to emulate
Muhammad Tughluq in uniting North and South India under his rule.

Aurangzeb and Shivaji: the struggle for the South

Aurangzeb stands in striking contrast to Akbar whose empire he extended
to its farthest limits, but which he also destroyed in the process. In the five
decades of Aurangzeb’s reign (1658–1707) the Mughal empire expanded
so much that it could hardly be ruled any longer. He conquered the
sultanates of the Deccan, the successor states of the large realm of the
Bahmani sultans. Despite constant fighting among themselves these states
had none the less shown enough solidarity to be able to defeat the army of
Vijayanagar in the decisive battle of Talikota in 1565. One century later
they were no longer able to defend themselves against Aurangzeb.
After these southern conquests Aurangzeb tried to integrate the ruling
class of these states into his imperial elite. A comparison of the highest
ranks (mansab) of this latter elite during the first two decades of
Aurangzeb’s reign with those of the last three decades shows a decisive
structural change. In the first period there were 191 officers holding ranks
from 2,000 to 7,000; only 32 of them were from the Deccan and 110
belonged to families which had been in imperial service in earlier
generations. In the second period the number of these officers of the
highest rank increased to 270; 95 of them belonged to the Deccan and only
129 came from families which had been in service in earlier times. The
structural change appears even more striking if we look only at the highest
officers with a rank of 7,000. There were only 6 of them in the first period,
1 of them belonging to the Deccan; in the second period there were 14, of
whom 9 belonged to the Deccan. In his eagerness to please the elite of the