THE RISE AND FALL OF THE MUGHAL EMPIREconstellations in India, the British and the French emerged as partners of
Indian rulers who waged war against each other. In this way the Europeans
were drawn into Indian affairs to an ever-increasing degree. The French
governor, Joseph François Dupleix, who assumed his office at Pondichery
in 1742 after having served for two decades in the French factory of
Chandernagar in Bengal, was a very astute diplomat who knew how to
play off Indian rulers against each other.
Although Dupleix’s resources were very limited, he put them to good
use. He had the excellent idea of having Indian mercenaries trained by
French officers as infantrymen adept in the latest methods of European
warfare. Such troops, whilst relatively cheap, could deal a fatal blow to the
Indian cavalry. The elite of Indian warriors were daring horsemen used to
riding roughshod through the lines of the enemy’s ill-equipped and
undisciplined foot soldiers; they were, however, mowed down by the
European-trained infantry firing with the regular precision of a machine.
Just as Baber had founded the Mughal empire on the superior power of
muskets and artillery, this type of infantry established the foundation of
European power in India. The secret of its success lay entirely in its drill
and organisation: the weapons were readily available to Indian rulers, too.
But Indian generals were prevented by their cavalry mentality from
appreciating the merits of this new type of European-trained infantry. They
had respect only for an enemy who would confront them on horseback: for
this reason the European subversion of Indian warfare was even more
easily accomplished.
In concentrating on the infantry the Europeans made a virtue out of
necessity. Cavalry units had always been very expensive, particularly in
India, and the parsimonious directors of the European East India
companies—who in any case disapproved of military adventures—would
never have sanctioned the funds of maintenance of cavalry units. But the
pay of foot soldiers was minimal in India, and they were courageous and
ready to learn if they were properly taught how to fight. In Indian armies
they played the same role as the pawns in a game of chess: they shielded
the more valuable units of the army and, in straggling along, frequently
obstructed the movements of the enemy; by the same token, they might
also impede their own units. The armed infantryman (toofangchi), who
knew how to handle a musket, was represented in Indian armies even in
the sixteenth century. The peasants had used similar weapons when
rebelling against the Mughal government. However, both the toofangchi
and the peasant shot in their own individualist manner: they were
marksmen, sometimes very good ones, who aimed at their individual
target. It was impossible to organise them in regular columns and make
them shoot in a disciplined rhythm collectively. After all, this method of
infantry warfare was new even in Europe. It was Dupleix’s special
achievement to adopt it in India. The British were quick to learn this lesson