THE RISE AND FALL OF THE MUGHAL EMPIREBy the turn of the century the contours of the British empire in India were
already firmly delineated. The coasts and the fertile plains of the interior
were in British hands. The Indian princes who had made their peace with the
British retained some internal autonomy, but could not conduct any foreign
policy of their own: they were embedded in the British Indian empire like
insects in amber. The only region where British control was still rather
precarious was the northwest. The power vacuum that had come into
existence here after Mahadaji Scindia’s death was filled by the martial Sikhs,
who established a kingdom under Maharaja Ranjit Singh at the very time
when Tipu Sultan’s realm in the south was captured. Just like Tipu Sultan,
Ranjit Singh was a very competent military leader who tried his best to learn
from the Europeans; in contrast with Tipu, however, he carefully avoided a
confrontation with the British. He built up both infantry and artillery units
on modern lines, but his main strength was still the Sikh cavalry—which
could not always be easily coordinated with those other elements of the
army. Under his weak successors Ranjit Singh’s realm rapidly decayed and
was finally annexed by the British. The pattern of dealing with the Marathas
was repeated here. Sikh leaders who were willing to make peace with the
British were accommodated and retained some autonomy, but the fertile
plains of the Panjab came under direct British rule. This region became the
granary of British India and the chief recruiting ground for the British Indian
army. Generations of historians have tried to answer the same questions:
why were the British able to extend their control over India within a few
decades? How did a few isolated bridgeheads on the coast expand into
territorial rule over vast areas? The British often tended to agree with those
who maintained that this empire was acquired in a fit of absentmindedness.
But there were others who used to emphasise that India was conquered by
the sword and had to be held by the sword. There is some justification for
both points of view.
The conquest of India never loomed large in British public awareness.
No great national effort was required in order to gain this huge empire.
The battles which the British fought in India were not of very great
dimensions and they were fought with Indian mercenaries at no expense to
the British taxpayer. Force of arms did play a major role both in the
acquisition and in the maintenance of the empire, but it was a very
parsimonious use of force. The conquest of India by a trading company
meant careful cost-accounting in matters of warfare, just as in everything
else. The British did not indulge in hazardous military adventures. They
also knew how Indian rulers financed their war efforts; by plunder and
land revenue. They learned this lesson very well, and they learned their
lessons collectively. The company as an organisation would preserve the
experience gained by its brightest and boldest members; hence, even its
more mediocre recruits could carry on in the same vein. The affairs of
Indian states, on the other hand, often revolved around the individual great