THE FREEDOM MOVEMENT AND THE PARTITION OF INDIAhis civil disobedience campaign honourably before it turned into
uncontrolled violence as it had done at Chauri Chaura in 1922. Moreover,
the first Round Table Conference in London—which the Congress had
boycotted—had been successfully concluded in the meantime and the
participants had returned to India exuding optimism. Irwin was keen to
lend credibility to the next Round Table Conference by involving the
Congress. Gandhi, who was not at all interested in British-Indian
constitutional reforms because he considered the Congress to be the only
political forum in India, was nevertheless prevailed upon to attend the
second Round Table Conference. The optimism of those who had attended
the first—including the representatives of the Indian princes—was one of
the reasons for this decision. But even more important were the talks which
Gandhi had with Purushottamdas Thakurdas, the great Bombay magnate
who had so far supported Gandhi’s campaign. Bombay, which was the
mainspring of Congress finance, had felt the severe pinch of credit
contraction in the wake of the Great Depression and could no longer back
the freedom movement sufficiently. At the same time the civil disobedience
campaign had swelled the ranks of political workers who depended on
Gandhi’s fundraising ingenuity. Under such circumstances it was difficult
for Gandhi to make ends meet and he had to arrive at a compromise.
In March 1931 Irwin and Gandhi concluded a pact by which Irwin
gained much and Gandhi very little. The civil disobedience campaign was
suspended. Irwin released most, but not all, prisoners and permitted the
production of salt for individual home consumption. He did not make any
further concessions. He pointed out that he was unable to recover the land
which was confiscated from peasants who had refused to pay land revenue
and which had been auctioned off to others. He also categorically refused
to enquire into charges of police brutality in suppressing agitations.
Gandhi appreciated the pact because of its symbolic significance rather
than for its specific concessions. The viceroy had negotiations with him on
equal terms. Gandhi saw in this ‘a change of heart’, whereas Winston
Churchill—equally aware of the symbolic significance of this pact—
deplored it as a disgraceful lowering of British prestige. Jawaharlal Nehru
was furious about the agreement and said that had his father Motilal (who
had died recently) been still alive, it would never have been concluded. He
felt that this pact was a betrayal of the cause of the peasants who had been
driven into the arms of the Congress by the Great Depression and who had
shown that they were willing and able to put up a fight. They were now let
down by the Congress, which had to refrain from all agitation after
Gandhi had suspended the campaign. The pact was, indeed, concluded
when the peasant movement was at its height. As soon as the landlords
noticed that the Congress could no longer support the peasants they
pounced on them and observed no limits in the degree to which they
exploited them.