THE REPUBLICvery clearly. Kissinger told the Indian ambassador in Washington that China
would surely attack in the event of Indian intervention in East Pakistan, and
that there would be no American help for India in this case. On the other
hand, the rising influx of refugees from East Pakistan into India and the
massive transfer of troops from West to East Pakistan alarmed Indira
Gandhi, who was probably convinced by that time that an armed
intervention would be necessary. So she sent urgent messages to Moscow,
indicating her willingness to sign the treaty as soon as possible. The foreign
minister Gromyko was hastily dispatched to New Delhi and the Treaty of
Peace, Friendship and Cooperation was signed on 8 August 1971.
The speed at which this was accomplished seems to prove that the text
of the treaty had been settled some time earlier. For the Soviet Union this
was a major achievement as President Brezhnev had not hitherto found
partners for his much advertised Asian security system. Now there was at
least a treaty with India, and Soviet diplomacy greatly emphasised this
treaty in subsequent years, whereas India was not so enamoured of it once
the armed intervention in East Pakistan had been successfully completed.
The treaty did not provide for a military pact, it only contained clauses
which obliged both parties to refrain from entering military alliances which
would be harmful to the other. Thus the treaty was no guarantee of Soviet
support for India in the event of India’s armed intervention in East
Pakistan. But if India had fared badly in such an intervention—and
particularly if third parties had joined the fray—the Soviet Union could not
have afforded to let India down. For this very reason, the Soviet Union did
not encourage India to proceed with this venture.
Before the final showdown Indira Gandhi went on a tour of the capitals
of the West in order to ask their heads of government to use their influence
to change the course of Pakistan’s destructive policy. After two futile and
frustrating sessions with Nixon she might as well have gone home without
talking to anybody else. However, she persevered with the whole futile
round not because she hoped for help, but because she wanted to make
sure that nobody could later accuse her of not having tried her best to
avoid the intervention. As the conflict drew nearer the Soviet Union
became more sympathetic to the Indian point of view—but did not
promise to give India full support, regardless of the consequences of the
venture. After India finally intervened in East Pakistan at the beginning of
December 1971 the Soviet Union vetoed UN resolutions which called for
an immediate ceasefire, but a Soviet deputy foreign minister was
dispatched to New Delhi in order to warn India that the Soviet Union
could not reiterate this veto indefinitely. However, when the Pakistani
troops surrendered on 16 December 1971 the Soviet Union was quick to
rejoice and a Soviet official at the UN emphasised that this was the first
time in history that the United States and China had been defeated
together.