Internet of Things Architecture

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Element to protect Risk D/R/E/A/D rating Examples of Causes Mitigation and relevant Design Choices (for the latter see

Section 5.2.10)

policies enforce medium

security

attacker. Probe discovery of access policies by authorised, though

compromised internal attackers are subtler, and have to be dealt with

through adaptive security (e.g., recognise a malicious pattern in the

regular probing of security decision points).

DC A.16- 17 : probing detection/reaction performed by autonomous security

Disclosure of identities

and cryptographic

material

M/H/H/M/L

enforce strong security

Not specifically targeted – addressable through security management

(databases).

Attacker denies legitimate

users access to

Infrastructure Services

M/H/L/M/L

enforce medium

security

Exclusion of the attacker, once identified as such through the Trust and

Reputation security Functional Component (see Section 4.2.2.7).

Massive disclosure of

user's personal

information

H/L/L/H/L

enforce strong security

Secure storage of personal data with dedicated protection architecture

(e.g. firewall diodes that let data flow in one direction only) and access

control rules – this is part of security management.

Disruption of a global

service

H/M/L/H/L

enforce strong security

Reliance on all security Functional Components (see Section 4.2.2.7) +

proper security management.

This threat can also be addressed by multihoming. See DC P.3

(Replication of instances of Functional Components locally) and DC P.4

(Replication of instances of functional components in the cloud).

Table 15 : DREAD assessment of the identified risks (see Table 14 ).