TheEconomistOctober30th 2021 SpecialreportStabilisingtheclimate 21mate”,asNaomiKlein,a writerandactivist,putsitinthesubtitle
toherbestsellingbook“ThisChangesEverything”(2014).Inthis
viewthefossilfuelindustry’sinsistenceonputtingitsownpro
fitsaheadoftheglobalrisksposedbyitseffluentisnotjusta brake
onsensibleclimatepolicybuta signofa systemicinabilityto
reachclimategoalsina capitalisteconomy.
Itisessentialthattheworldprovesthisthesistobewrong.Do
ingsomeansembracingtheaspectofcapitalismwhichmostwor
riesenvironmentalists:growth.Todevelopwhilereducingdepen
denceonfossilfuels—theonlysortofgrowthwitha realfuture—
thepoorworldneedsnewtechnologyandnewinvestment.The
growthsuppliedbycapitalismiswhatprovidesboththesethings,
whichiswhymosteconomistsseeit ascrucialtobringingthefos
silfuelagetoanend.Allthatisneededistofindwaystoensure
thatgrowthdoesnothavetobelinkedtorisingCO 2.
Theissueisnicelysummedupina formulacreditedtoYoichi
Kaya,a Japaneseenergyeconomist,whichlinksthesizeofthe
economy,thescaleofemissionsandtheamountofcarboninthe
energysystem:
Emissionsaretheproductofpopulation,gdpperhead,energy
usedperunitofgdpandcarbonemissionsfromthatenergy.Tore
duceemissionsonemustreduceoneormoreofthosefourfactors.
Privateandgovernmentactionontheclimatehasconcentratedon
thelasttwo:carbonemissionsperunitofenergy(decarbonisa
tion)andenergyuseperunitofgdp(efficiency).Butgiveninsuffi
cientprogress,somesayit istimetolookatthefirsttwo.
Thehistoryofthe20thcenturyshowsthatreducingpopula
tion,thoughstillspokenofasa longtermgoalbysomegreensand
predictedbydemographersformuchoftheworldlaterthiscentu
ry,isnota courseofactionthatgovernmentscaneffectivelyand
decentlypursue(thoughdealingwithunmetcontraceptiveneeds
certainlyis).Thatleavesgdpperhead.Whenthisgrows,asithas
bya factoroftenworldwidesincethecarbonneedlebegantotick
upinthe19thcentury,energyefficiencyandcarbonintensity
mustimprovemerelytokeepcarbonemissionsstable.Ifgrowth
stops,thebenefitsfromincreasedenergyefficiencyandreduced
carbonintensitycangostraightintoreducingemissions.
Thedegrowthdebate
Since the Paris agreement of 2015, discussion of degrowth has be
come an increasingly hot topic among some ecologists, heterodox
economists and other scholars. Some see it as a strategy solely for
the rich world, which they feel does not need any more affluence,
while accepting the need for continued growth in poorer places.
Others are dubious about the whole idea of sustained growth. Ei
ther version, though, has huge moral, political, and economic
drawbacks.
The moral problem is that, fine though it may be for individ
uals to renounce increased consumption, it is not for them to im
pose their choice on others. There are specific things that societies
can require people not to produce or consume, and there may be
reasons for rationing some things during emergencies and in spe
cial circumstances. But production and consumption in general
should remain matters of individual choice.
If those devoted to degrowth could persuade everyone else,
their goal might conceivably come about as a voluntary, consen
sual moral revolution. Otherwise they would need to gain political
power and impose their aims. And that raises the problem of polit
ical practicality. Governments can and do suppress growth in va
rious ways. Often they do it through wrongheadedness, hapless
ness or as the result of capture by pernicious interests. Sometimes
theydoitasexplicitpolicy—asintheausterityimposedonsome
countriesintheearly2010s.Butanovertpolicyofdeliberately
slowing,stallingorreversinglongtermgrowth,evenif presented
asbeingforthegoodoftheworld,isa highlyunpromisingplat
formonwhichtowinelections.
Evenifitwerenotbothwrongandimpractical,enforcedde
growthwouldstillbea badidea.Muchoftheincreaseinprosper
ityinpoorercountriesoverthepast 20 yearshasbeendrivenby
risingdemandfromrichcountries.Removethatmotorandthe
rateatwhichtheworld’spoorareraisedoutofpovertywouldslow.
It wouldalsohobblethefightagainstclimatechange.Rapiddecar
bonisationrequires massive investmentin renewablesevery
where,butmostofallinemergingeconomies.Muchofthemoney
mustcomefrominvestorsinrichcountriesseekingreturns,even
ifrichworldgovernmentscommitresourcestoo.Withouthuge
amountsofinvestment,decarbonisationwilltakelonger.
Andwithoutacceleratedinnovationitwillbeincomplete.The
currentsystemisnottheonlywaytogetfrombrightideastopro
ductsusedona broad,evenworldchanging,scale.Butithasthe
bestrecord.Alotofinnovationsarestillneedediftheworldisto
speedupitsdecarbonisation—betterwaysofstoringenergy,of
heatinghouses,ofcoolinghouses,ofprocessingcrops,ofgrowing
crops,ofpoweringlargevehicles,ofproducingplasticsandmore.
A contracting,lowdemand,lowinvestmenteconomyisnotlike
lytoprovideanyofthese.
Thiscaseagainstdegrowthdoesnotnecessarilymeanbusi
nessasusual,however.Toservethegoalofdecarbonisation,inno
vationmustbedirectedtowardsspecificgoalswithparticular
properties—itcannotsimplyroamfreelyinsearchofideasthat
lookprofitable.Someofthispurposecancomefromfoundersand
investors.Teslaisa goodexample:a companybuiltupbyElon
Musktomakebothmoneyandelectriccars,and,byshowingthat
itcoulddoso,toestablishtheneedforothercarmakerstofollowShare and share unlike
Cumulative CO2 emissions*, 1750-201, bn tonnes*Notincludingemissionsembeddedintradedgoodsor
emissionsfromland-usechange Source:OurWorldinDataSouth Africa 21
Other 26Brazil 15
Other 27UnitedStates
410Canada
33Mexico
20Other Australia^1EU-2
365Russia
114Ukraine
30Other 17China
220Japan
65India
52Iran 1
S.Korea 17S.Arabia 15Other
121Asia
50
Europe 525North America 470Africa
46Oceania
20South
America
42CO 2 = population!!!gdp energy CO 2
capita gdp energy