designation” or “provisional conceptual distinctions”
(prajñapti). The idea led in some schools to the denial
of a correspondence theory of truth and to a phe-
nomenalistic theory of perception and conception.
The idea of conventional reality as construct seems
to have followed three distinct, but at times overlap-
ping, lines of inquiry: one epistemological-linguistic,
one phenomenalistic, and the other mentalistic (some-
times called idealistic). The linguistic view is relevant
to psychology in the sense that it presupposes that
mind itself is constructed (vikalpita), or, at the very
least, conditioned by discursive thought (so that, for
instance, we will perceive what words tell us to per-
ceive or what the inner interplay between desire and
mental chatter drive us to think). This is generally the
tendency in the Madhyamaka traditions. The phe-
nomenalistic view, represented by schools that have
been identified with the SAUTRANTIKAtraditions, is a
theory of representation: Perception is an inner, men-
tal process in which one becomes aware of the mental
representation of external things (an almost natural
derivative of the hierarchy of the six senses). From ex-
treme phenomenalistic positions one can easily slide
into an idealistic understanding of how the apparently
real can feel real yet be an illusion: If the mind needs
only an inner representation of the world to feel like
it knows an external world, then all of conventional re-
ality may very well exist in the mental sphere, perhaps
only as mere mentation (vijñapti).
Perhaps the most significant derivatives of this third
line of speculation were the positions adopted among
followers of the YOGACARA SCHOOL. The idea of the
real as mere mentation (vijñaptimatrata), originally
proposed by ASAN ̇GA (ca. 320–390 C.E.) and VA-
SUBANDHU(fourth to fifth century C.E.) was developed
by Dharmapala (sixth century C.E.), who attempted to
explain how there could be both an ultimately real in-
ner world (consciousness) and a world that is objec-
tive (external to the mind) and ordered (subject to
causes and conditions). Dharmapala developed further
the school’s idea of a consciousness that is the reposi-
tory (ALAYAVIJN
ANA) of karmic traces, manifesting it-
self in eight forms of consciousness: the consciousness
corresponding to each of the five sense organs, men-
tal consciousness (manovijñana), a foundational but
still deluded consciousness (klistamanovijñana), and
the ground consciousness (alayavijñana).
This eightfold division of consciousness has been
arguably the most influential Buddhist topography of
the mind. Its applications extend, naturally, into the
questions of what makes the mind become pure, and
whether or not there is an inherently pure level of con-
sciousness (amalavijñana) or a mind that is inherently
awakened. The schema was central to theories of the
path, even among those East Asian Buddhists for
whom the theory of karma and the doctrine of rebirth
had lost its earlier importance—as was the case, for ex-
ample, in the use of the theory to explain Zen SATORI
(AWAKENING) in HAKUINEKAKU(1686–1768).Also important in scholastic theories of the devel-
opment of mind was the difficult concept of the “ba-
sis” (as ́raya) for the action and transformations of
karma. According to this conception, all aspects of the
psychosomatic person are in constant transformation;
if the person follows the path of the buddhas to its
completion, this basis is transformed or inverted
(a ́rayaparas vrtti), so that it is perfectly pure and the
normal faculties become the special powers and knowl-
edges of a buddha.Systematic reflections on the nature of mind over-
lap with ontological speculation, but the above three
theories of error and true knowledge also provide at
least part of the foundation for the ethical, contem-
plative, and soteriological dimensions of Buddhist the-
ory and practice. For instance, the transformation of
the psychosomatic basis (a ́rayaparas vrtti) is believed to
result, predictably, in a radical transformation of cog-
nition (jñana): body and mind become the living wis-
dom (active cognition) of a buddha. This wisdom has
five aspects. It is perfectly and constantly aware of the
true nature of things (dharmadhatu-jñana); it is a
serene, mirrorlike reflection of all things (adars ́a-
jñana); it cognizes the semblance and equivalence
of all things (samata-jñana); yet, it discerns clearly
(pratyaveksa-jñana) and engages freely in the work of
a buddha (krtyupasthana-jñana). Furthermore, this
wisdom is all-knowing, all-compassionate, and free
from any notion of a self. With such implications to
be derived from at least one Buddhist theory of mind,
the Western observer needs to be constantly aware of
the nuances that separate the intent and underlying
question in Buddhist speculation from those that tend
to drive Western psychological research.Comparing psychological theories
What may appear as a similar interest in the disphase
between conscious and unconscious storage and re-
trieval is not understood in Buddhism as a question of
psychoneurology or intrapsychic conflict, but as a dis-
tinction between memory and karmic causation. ThePSYCHOLOGY