by the Nicene church, but renewed substantially by the Tübingen school, as being the doctrine of
John. According to Baur (l.c., p. 363) σάρξ ἐγενετοis not equivalent to (ἄνθρωπος ἐγένετο, but
means that the Logos assumed a human body and continued otherwise the same. The incarnation
was only an incidental phenomenon in the unchanging personality of the Logos. Moreover the flesh
of Christ was not like that of other men, but almost immaterial, so at; to be able to walk on the lake
(John 6:16; Comp. 7:10, 15; 8:59 10:39). To this exegesis we object:- John expressly ascribes to Christ a soul, John 10:11, 15, 17; 12:27 (ἡ ψυχῇ μου
τετάρακται), and a spirit, 11:33 (ἐνεβριμήσατο τῷ πνεύματι); 13:21 (ἐταραχθη τῷ πνεύματι);
19:30 (παρέδωκεν τὸ πνεῦμα). It may be said that pneu’ma is here nothing more than the animal
soul, because the same affection is attributed to both, and because it was surrendered in death. But
Christ calls himself in John frequently "the Son of man" 1:51, etc.), and once "a man"
(ἄνθρωπος,8:40), which certainly must include the more important intellectual and spiritual part
as well as the body. - "Flesh" is often used in the Old and New Testament for the whole man, as in the phrase
"all flesh" (πᾶσα σάρξ, every mortal man), or μία σαρ́ξ(John 17:2; Rom. 3:20; 1 Cor. 1:29; Gal.
2:16). In this passage it suited John’s idea better than ἄνθρωπος,because it more strongly expresses
the condescension of the Logos to the human nature in its present condition, with its weakness,
trials, temptations, and sufferings. He completely identified himself with our earthly lot, and became
homogeneous with us, even to the likeness, though not the essence, of sin (Rom. 8:3; comp. Heb.
2:14; 5:8, 9). "Flesh" then, when ascribed to Christ, has the same comprehensive meaning in John
as it has in Paul (comp. also 1 Tim. 3:16). It is animated flesh, and the soul of that flesh contains
the spiritual as well as the physical life.
II. Another difficulty is presented by the verb ἐγένετο. The champions of the modern Kenosis
theory (Thomasius, Gess, Ebrard, Godet, etc.), while differing from the Apollinarian substitution
of the Logos for a rational human soul in Christ, assert that the Logos himself because a human
soul by voluntary transformation; and so they explain ejgevneto and the famous Pauline phrase
ἑαυτὸν ἐκένωσεν, μορφὴν δούλου λαβών(Phil. 2:7). As the water was changed into wine at Cana
(John 2:9: Τὸ ὕδωρ οἷνον γεγενημένον), so the Logos in infinite self-denial changed his divine
being into a human being during the state of his humiliation, and thus led a single life, not a double
life (as the Chalcedonian theory of two complete natures simultaneously coexisting in the same
person from the manger to the cross seems to imply). But - The verb ἐγένετοmust be understood in agreement with the parallel passages:, "he came
in the flesh," 1 John 4:2 (ἐν σαρκὶ ἐληλυθότα); 2 John 7 (ἐρχόμενον ἐν σαρκί), with this difference,
that "became" indicates the realness of Christ’s manhood, "came" the continuance of his godhood.
Compare also Paul’s expression, ἐφανερώθη ἐν σαρκί,1 Tim. 3:16. - Whatever may be the objections to the Chalcedonian dyophysitism, they cannot be
removed by running the Kenosis to the extent of a self-suspension of the Logos or an actual surrender
of his essential attributes; for this is a metaphysical impossibility, and inconsistent with the
unchangeableness of God and the intertrinitarian process. The Logos did not cease to be God when
he entered into the human state of existence, nor did he cease to be man when he returned to the
state of divine glory which he had with the Father before the foundation of the world.
III. Beyschlag (Die Christologie des N. T, p. 168) denies the identity of the Logos with
Christ, and resolves the Logos into a divine principle, instead of a person. "Der Logos ist nicht die
A.D. 1-100.