NOAM CHOMSKY AND GRAMMAR 195
tion from other mental faculties, therefore, is a bit of a mystery. Language is, as
far as we know, a relatively recent phenomenon, having emerged between
100,000 and 40,000 years ago. Chomsky (1972), Gould (1991), and others ar-
gued on this basis that there was insufficient time for language to evolve as an
adaptation through natural selection and thus is anexaptation,a term that de-
scribes the coopting of previously evolved functions to do new things. How-
ever, if Rumelhart and McClelland (1986) are correct, language not only
developed through evolutionary processes but also is a specialized adaptation
of the general cognitive function of pattern recognition. In this case, language
is innate in the same sense that our abilities to recognize patterns and establish
cause–effect relations are innate.
Calvin (2004), drawing on his work in neurobiology, made a compelling ar-
gument that the origin of language was associated with improved planning
among early hominids. Planning involves structured thought, particularly with
respect to cause–effect relations. For this reason, it was popular a few decades
ago to propose that language developed as a result of organized hunting—“un-
til it turned out that chimps had all the basic moves without using vocalizations.
Now it is supposed that much of the everyday payoff for language has to do
with socializing and sexual selection, where ‘verbal grooming’ and gossip be-
come important players” (p. 50). In Calvin’s view, the evolution of language is
related to general cognitive development through an expanded neocortex,
which began withHomo erectus1.8 million years ago. The cognitive apparatus
necessary for language would have significantly predated actual language, if
Calvin is correct. Improved socialization and sexual selection had evolutionary
consequences that tapped existing abilities.
The roots of Chomsky’s (1995) view extend to Plato, who believed that a wide
range of human behaviors and attributes were innate. Prior to the 17thcentury,
virtue, morality, mathematical ability, even the concept of God, were thought to
be innate. Failures in virtue or morality, and even disagreements about what con-
stituted “the good,” were explained on the basis of functional capacity. The virtu-
ous person had a grasp of right and wrong and behaved appropriately, whereas
his or her counterpart was deemed to be mentally defective in some way. If we
consider language as an innate “perfect system,” we are led ineluctably to the
conclusion that the problems in language that we can observe on a daily ba-
sis—such as ungrammatical sentences in writing—are the result of a defective
functional capacity. A perfectly functioning language faculty would not produce
errors. This is difficult terrain. Can we legitimately conclude that the numerous
errors we see in speech and writing, particularly that of our students, are the result
of defective functional capacity? Would not such a conclusion lead inevitably to
another—that many students simply cannot be taught?