The Economist November 20th 2021 57
Asia
SouthEastAsia’sinfowars
The embrace of the motherland
E
very nightLee Ah Huat (not his real
name) turns on the news. The 60some
thing engineer lives in Malaysia’s capital,
Kuala Lumpur, but he does not bother with
local channels. He goes straight to cctv,
China’s state broadcaster, and usually
watches its international broadcast in Chi
nese. Mr Lee’s family left China and settled
in Malaysia decades ago. He maintains few
direct connections to his ancestral home
and has complicated feelings about it.
Yet when it comes to current affairs, his
views are straightforward. The protests in
Hong Kong and the oppression of the
Uyghurs, an ethnic minority, are “China’s
domestic issues”. American politicians
who bang on about the Chinese state’s hu
manrights abuses are, in this view, hypo
crites. Just look at “how America treats Af
ricanAmericans or Native Americans.
They murdered them, stole their land.
America is just causing trouble.”
Mr Lee’s remarks would delight the Chi
nese Communist Party (ccp). At least 30m
members of the Chinese diaspora, 6070%
of the total, live in SouthEast Asia. They
are the targets of increasingly sophisticat
ed Chinese statesponsored influence op
erations. Though few members of the dias
pora are Chinese citizens, the state expects
them to have strong sympathies with their
ancestral homeland. They have an impor
tant role to play in what the party calls Chi
na’s “great rejuvenation”.
In 2018 the United Front Work Depart
ment, the main organ responsible for in
fluence operations among people who are
not party members, absorbed the Overseas
Chinese Affairs Office, responsible for
tending to those abroad. Jacob Wallis of the
Australian Strategic Policy Institute, a
thinktank, thinks that “the ccpsees the
diaspora as a powerful vector of influence”
and is trying to recruit its members.
The SouthEast Asian diaspora is of par
ticular interest to China’s infowarriors be
cause China thinks it has a “natural right”
to primacy in the region, says Kenton Thi
baut of the Atlantic Council, an American
thinktank. “China sees it as an easy prov
ing ground,” she adds, where it can “start to
express itself as a global power”.
How to recruit these potential parti
sans? “Wherever the readers are, wherever
the viewers are, that is where propaganda
reports must extend their tentacles,” said
Xi Jinping, China’s president, in 2015. Their
grip can be felt almost everywhere. “Over
the past decade, topccpofficials have over
seen a dramatic expansion in efforts to
shape media content and narratives
around the world,” according to a report in
2020 by Freedom House, a watchdog.
“This push feels particularly strong in
SouthEast Asia because there are more
outlets that are willing to rebroadcast
some of these claims,” says Ja Ian Chong of
the National University of Singapore.
Prominent state media like cctv are broad
cast in every SouthEast Asian country.
Some, including Xinhua, a government
news agency, have struck attractive con
tentsharing deals with cashstrapped lo
cal newspapers, wire services and televi
sion broadcasters in Vietnam, Laos and
Thailand. In 2017 a Chinese firm and the
Cambodian interior ministry launched a
tvstation which carries content from Chi
na’s official media.
S INGAPORE
China’s propagandists take aim at South-East Asia’s Chinese diaspora
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