80 Finance & economics TheEconomistNovember20th 2021
Benjamin Metzger of Barclays, another
bank.Unitedwasthefirsttodosowitha
securedloaninJune2020.Deltafollowed
witha bondofferingsoonafter.
Thedealshaveattractedmoreinvestors
thanbondssecuredbyoldaircraft(which,
unlike loyalty schemes, depreciate).
Schemebackeddebttendstoboasta better
creditrating thanthe airlineissuing it.
Andinvestorsarecomfortedbythestruc
tureofthedeals,whichusetheschemes’
cashflowstorepaydebt,andlimitriskif an
airline goes bust. Affinity Capital Ex
change,a fintechfirm, isworking with
JPMorganto securitiseairmiles,sothat
theycanbemoreeasilytraded.
Thetrickforairlinesinallthisistobal
ancethecostsandbenefitsofperkssothat
customers stay engaged, while carriers’
marginsarepreserved.Endless devalua
tionscouldrattlethatequilibriumandup
setsecuritisationarrangements.Skyhigh
valuationsarenotassured. n
Ethiopia’sgrowthmodel
Lost promise
O
neofthemostextraordinarygrowth
records over the past two decades was
to be found, perhaps surprisingly, in the
horn of Africa. Real gdpper person in Ethi
opia, the secondmostpopulous country
in Africa, rose by an average annual rate of
9.3% from 1999 to 2019, just 0.4 percentage
points less than China’s pace of growth.
Now a yearlong war between Ethiopia’s
government and forces led by the Tigrayan
People’s Liberation Front (tplf) threatens
to spill into the capital city, wreak humani
tarian disaster and wipe away those eco
nomic gains.
From the late 1990s, a roaring Chinese
economy provided the impetus for a boom
in the rest of the developing world. As Chi
na became richer, some of its industry
moved abroad, allowing poorer countries
like Bangladesh and Vietnam to follow in
its wake. In the 2010s some optimists
hoped that this process of sequential in
dustrialisation might eventually shift to
Africa. More than any other country there,
Ethiopia illustrated this potential.
Three decades ago, its economy was
among the world’s least developed. Then
in 1991 forces led by the tplfoverthrew the
Marxist regime that had long run things.
Though the tplfdominated government
remained authoritarian, it began liberalis
ing the economy and directing investment
towards infrastructure. Ethiopia’s gdpper
person has risen more than sevenfold
since 1995, faster than other subSaharan
economies and the emerging world as a
whole (see chart). The share of Ethiopians
living in extreme poverty fell from half the
populationto under a quarter in the 2010s.
Ethiopia’s success was first owed to in
creasing productivity in agriculture, which
lifted incomes and helped the construc
tion and service sectors expand. While em
ployment in industry rose rapidly from the
late 1990s into the 2010s, most manufac
turing workers laboured at small firms,
making food and beverage products and
other goods for local markets. Coffee and
cut flowers remain big exports.
Yet over the past decade, manufactur
ing for export has gained a foothold. In in
dustrial parks scattered across the country
factories sprang up, many dedicated to
making the textiles and clothing that often
represent the first rung on the industrial
isation ladder. Apparel giants like h&m
and Primark began sourcing products from
Ethiopian plants, and the value of clothing
exports rose more than sixfold from 2009
to 2019. Foreign direct investment roughly
quadrupled from 2011 to 2017, much of it
fromChina.Thevastmajorityofdirectin
vestment—about 80%—flowed into the
manufacturingsector.
But economic development depends
moreonsustaininggrowthoverlongperi
odsthanonburstsofexplosivegrowth.
FightinginTigray,oneofEthiopia’smost
importantindustrialcentres,hasidledor
destroyed many factories. Others are
increasinglybeingshutoutofmarkets.On
November2nd PresidentJoe Biden sus
pended Ethiopia’s tarifffree access to
America,citing“grossviolationsofinter
nationally recognised human rights”,
chieflybytheforcesoftheprimeminister,
AbiyAhmed.Planstoprivatisemoreofthe
economyarefalteringasforeigninvestors
losetheirappetite.
A swift, diplomatic resolution to the
crisis may let Ethiopia salvage something
of its economic miracle. Still, the road
ahead would be difficult. Even before the
Tigrayan forces’ advance, the government
faced unmanageable foreign debts of near
ly 30% of gdp: a heavy burden for a poor
country coping with covid19, and which
collects less than 7% of gdpin tax.
Nor can the destruction of capital be
easily undone. Foreign investors may
prove difficult to lure back. China enjoyed
good relations with the tplf when the
group ran the country, and might be ex
pected to provide support if the tplfwins.
But it faces a slowdown at home; and be
cause China’s spending in Ethiopia fa
voured manufacturing, rather than the
production of commodities needed by Chi
nese industry, it may treat its investments
there with less urgency.
A protracted conflict, by contrast,
would undo most or all of the country’s
past economic gains. Whatever happens
next, Ethiopia’s case already demonstrates
that a state’s capacity to maintainorderis
the most important, and often themost
elusive, condition for development.n
A remarkable development story
is in peril
Growth spurt
GDPperperson*,1995=100
Source:IMF *Atpurchasing-power parity
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
2015100520001995
Sub-SaharanAfrica
Emerging
markets
Ethiopia
GDP per person
22, $’
2.9
11.6
.0
Pre-war progress