86 Books & arts The Economist November 20th 2021
Zemmour declares that the three members
of a French family who were murdered in a
terrorist attack at a Jewish school in Tou
louse in 2012, and who were buried in
Israel, did not belong to France.
The second obsession is paranoia about
decline, and the failure of elites to protect
French identity. For Maurras, the chief
menace to it was that enemy within: Jews,
Protestants, Freemasons and foreigners.
For Barrès, the enemy was principally
without: Germany, and its military might.
For Mr Camus and Mr Zemmour, it is above
all Islam. Echoing the “great replacement
theory”, Mr Zemmour claims that, in to
day’s France, “an Islamic civilisation is re
placing a people from a Christian, Greco
Roman civilisation”. “Veiled women”, Mr
Camus recently told a tvinterviewer, “are
the flags of conquest, of colonisation”.
Today’s reactionaries tap into a deep
undercurrent of fear and paranoia in
France, but also of antiSemitism. An
unapologetic antiSemite, Maurras de
fended the French army’s accusations
against Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish French
captain wrongly convicted by the French
army of high treason in 1894. That was a
time, among the Catholic and military
French elite, of intense anxiety about spies
and traitors, and of conspiracy theories
about Jewish financiers. In “Jewish
France”, a virulent antiSemitic tract pub
lished in 1886, Edouard Drumont had
warned of the threat of a “Jewish conquest”
of France, led by a “hateful, goldhungry”
people bent on bringing about the “painful
agony of a generous nation”.
Himself of Jewish and Algerian descent,
Mr Zemmour occupies an ambiguous
place in this tradition. By hinting today
that Dreyfus may not have been innocent,
or defending Vichy for “protecting” French
Jews—because it deported foreign ones
first—Mr Zemmour is confecting not a se
rious historical assessment but a studied
provocation. As well as distorting history,
this is a way of “signalling his link to a pil
lar of French society, which is the army,
and to a particular set of rightwing val
ues”, suggests Jean Garrigues, a historian at
the University of Orléans.
That such views are given a legitimate
airing is new, and disquieting. JeanMarie
Le Pen, who founded the hardright party
that his daughter, Marine Le Pen, rebrand
ed and now leads, appalled the salons of
Paris and was treated accordingly. Mr Zem
mour, who is wellread and flatters the
French regard for the cultivé, is handled
with respect. Aspiring presidential candi
dates are invited by debate moderators,
with scarcely a blush, to offer their per
spective on the “great replacement theory”.
Moreover, France lacks the counterbal
ancing intellectual voices of the past. “At
the time of Maurras, Émile Zola and repub
licans fought back. But the intellectual left
andradicalleftinFrancehavebeenswept
away,”saysSudhirHazareesingh,a politi
calscientistatOxfordUniversityandau
thorof“HowtheFrenchThink”.Today,no
Frenchthinkerhasthetoweringstatureof
JeanPaul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir,
AlbertCamus,MichelFoucaultorothersin
turtlenecksandtrenchcoatsontheleft
bank whose influence lingered wellbe
yondtheirlifetimes.
Noleftwingpoliticalleaderhasa com
manding influence, either.In this void,
toxictheoriesareresuscitated,andusedto
framediscussion,withoutrobustorper
suasiverebuke.Aselsewhere,reasonand
rationalityseem,likecontempt,tobefrag
iletoolsagainstthepotentnarrativeforce
ofpopulistreactionaries.The declineof
thepublicintellectualontheFrenchleft
removesonemorelineofdefence.n
Artificialintelligence
Mechanical minds
E
arlylastyear,researchersattheMass
achusetts Institute of Technology (mit)
used a machinelearning algorithm to look
for new antibiotics. After training the sys
tem on molecules with antimicrobial
properties, they let it loose on huge data
bases of compounds and found one that
worked. Because it operated in a different
way, even bacteria that had developed a
resistance to traditional antibiotics could
not evade the new drug.
Behind the success was a deeper truth:
the algorithm was able to spot aspects of
reality that humans had not contemplated,
might not be able to detect and may never
comprehend. The implications of this gen
eral development for science, business and
warfare—and indeed, for what it means to
be human—are the subject of these rumi
nations by Henry Kissinger, America’s pre
eminent living statesman, Eric Schmidt,
the former boss of Google, and Daniel Hut
tenlocher, an expert on artificial intelli
gence (ai) at mit.
In their telling, the most important way
that aiwill change society is by redefining
the basis of knowledge. “Whether we con
sider it a tool, a partner, or a rival, [ai] will
alter our experience as reasoning beings
and permanently change our relationship
with reality,” the authors write. “The result
will be a new epoch.” If uttered by a Soy
lentquaffing coder, that sentiment might
be dismissed as hyperbole. Coming from
authors of this pedigree, it ought to be tak
en seriously.
In an essay in theAtlanticmagazine in
2018, Mr Kissinger argued thatairepre
sents the end of the Enlightenment. This
book substantiates that thesis with an en
gaging romp through the history of reason
and decisionmaking. Unsurprisingly, the
crunchiest discussion is of international
security. The authors show that aiis radi
cally changing the way states challenge
one another, and why fighting wars with
autonomous weapons—which could de
vise strategies, identify targets and kill op
ponents—invites calamity. Interactions
between rivals will become harder to pred
ict, and conflicts more difficult to limit.
Hitherto in the era of nuclear weapons,
the central objective of nationalsecurity
policy has been deterrence. That rests on
the premise that a rival state’s capabilities
are visible, its doctrine known and its ac
The Age of AI.By Henry Kissinger, Eric
Schmidt and Daniel Huttenlocher. Little,
Brown and Company; 272 pages; $30.
John Murray; £20
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