rule, the framing of hypotheses is the most difficult part of scientific work, and the part where
great ability is indispensable. So far, no method has been found which would make it possible to
invent hypotheses by rule. Usually some hypothesis is a necessary preliminary to the collection of
facts, since the selection of facts demands some way of determining relevance. Without something
of this kind, the mere multiplicity of facts is baffling.
The part played by deduction in science is greater than Bacon supposed. Often, when a hypothesis
has to be tested, there is a long deductive journey from the hypothesis to some consequence that
can be tested by observation. Usually the deduction is mathematical, and in this respect Bacon
underestimated the importance of mathematics in scientific investigation.
The problem of induction by simple enumeration remains unsolved to this day. Bacon was quite
right in rejecting simple enumeration where the details of scientific investigation are concerned,
for in dealing with details we may assume general laws on the basis of which, so long as they are
taken as valid, more or less cogent methods can be built up. John Stuart Mill framed four canons
of inductive method, which can be usefully employed so long as the law of causality is assumed;
but this law itself, he had to confess, is to be accepted solely on the basis of induction by simple
enumeration. The thing that is achieved by the theoretical organization of science is the collection
of all subordinate inductions into a few that are very comprehensive --perhaps only one. Such
comprehensive inductions are confirmed by so many instances that it is thought legitimate to
accept, as regards them, an induction by simple enumeration. This situation is profoundly
unsatisfactory, but neither Bacon nor any of his successors have found a way out of it.
-545-CHAPTER VIII Hobbes's LeviathanHOBBES ( 1588-1679) is a philosopher whom it is difficult to classify. He was an empiricist, like
Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, but unlike them, he was an admirer of mathematical method, not
only in pure mathematics, but in its applications. His general outlook was inspired by Galileo
rather than Bacon. From Descartes to Kant, Continental philosophy derived much of its
conception of the nature of human knowledge from mathematics, but it regarded mathematics as
known independently of experience. It was thus led, like Platonism, to minimize the part played
by perception, and over-emphasize the part played by pure thought. English empiricism, on the
other hand, was little influenced by mathematics, and tended to have a wrong conception of
scientific method. Hobbes had neither of these defects. It is not until our own day that we find any
other philosophers who were empiricists and yet laid due stress on mathematics. In this respect,
Hobbes's merit is great. He has, however, grave defects, which make it impossible to place him
quite in the first rank. He is impatient of subtleties, and too much inclined to cut the Gordian knot.
His solutions of problems are logical, but are attained by omitting awkward facts. He is vigorous,
but crude; he wields the battle-axe better than the rapier. Nevertheless, his theory of the State
deserves to be carefully considered, the more so as it is more modern than any previous theory,
even that of Machiavelli.
Hobbes's father was a vicar, who was ill-tempered and uneducated; he lost his job by quarrelling
with a neighbouring vicar at the church door. After this, Hobbes was brought up by an uncle. He
acquired a good knowledge of the classics, and translated The Medea of Euripides into Latin
iambics at the age of fourteen. (In later life, he boasted, justifiably, that though he abstained from
quoting classical poets and orators, this was not from lack of familiarity with their works.) At