connection between these we are mistaken. This argument is not conclusive on the general
question, but it shows that it is rash to suppose that we perceive causal relations when we think
we do. The balance, therefore, is in favour of Hume's view that there is nothing in cause except
invariable succession. The evidence, however, is not so conclusive as Hume supposed.
Hume is not content with reducing the evidence of a causal connection to experience of
frequent conjunction; he proceeds to argue that such experience does not justify the expectation
of similar conjunctions in the future. For example: when (to repeat a former illustration) I see an
apple, past experience makes me expect that it win taste like an apple, and not like roast beef;
but there is no rational justification for this expectation. If there were such a justification, it
would have to proceed from the principle "that those instances, of which we have had no
experience, resemble those of which we have had experience." This principle is not logically
necessary, since we can at least conceive a change in the course of nature. It should therefore be
a principle of probability. But all probable arguments assume this principle, and therefore it
cannot itself be proved by any probable argument, or even rendered probable by any such
argument. "The supposition, that the future resembles the past, is not founded on arguments of
any kind, but is derived entirely from habit. * The conclusion is one of complete scepticism:
"All probable reasoning is nothing but a species of sensation. 'Tis not solely in poetry and
music, we must follow our taste and sentiment, but likewise in philosophy. When I am
convinced of any principle, 'tis only an idea, which strikes more strongly upon me. When I give
the preference to one set of arguments above another, I do nothing but decide from my feeling
concerning the superiority of their influence. Objects have no discoverable connexion together;
nor is it from any other principle but custom operating upon the imagination, that we can draw
any inference from the appearance of one to the existence of another." â€
The ultimate outcome of Hume's investigation of what passes for knowledge is not what we
must suppose him to have desired. The sub-title of his book is: "An attempt to introduce the
experimental
* Book I, Part III, Sec. IV.â
€
Book I, Part III, Sec. VIII.