pessimism, and his doctrine that will is superior to knowledge. His pessimism made it possible for
men to take to philosophy without having to persuade themselves that all evil can be explained
away, and in this way, as an antidote, it was useful. From a scientific point of view, optimism and
pessimism are alike objectionable: optimism assumes, or attempts to prove, that the universe
exists to please us, and pessimism that it exists to displease us. Scientifically, there is no evidence
that it is concerned with us either one way or the other. The belief in either pessimism or optimism
is a matter of temperament, not of reason, but the optimistic temperament has been much
commoner among Western philosophers. A representative of the opposite party is therefore likely
to be useful in bringing forward considerations which would otherwise be overlooked.
More important than pessimism was the doctrine of the primacy of the will. It is obvious that this
doctrine has no necessary logical connection with pessimism, and those who held it after
Schopenhauer frequently found in it a basis for optimism. In one form or another, the doctrine that
will is paramount has been held by many modern philosophers, notably Nietzsche, Bergson,
James, and Dewey. It has, moreover, acquired a vogue outside the circles of professional
philosophers. And in proportion as will has gone up in the scale, knowledge has gone down. This
is, I think, the most notable change that has come over the temper of philosophy in our age. It was
prepared by Rousseau and Kant, but was first proclaimed in its purity by Schopenhauer. For this
reason, in spite of inconsistency and a certain shallowness, his philosophy has considerable
importance as a stage in historical development.
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CHAPTER XXV Nietzsche
NIETZSCHE ( 1844-1900) regarded himself, rightly, as the successor of Schopenhauer, to whom,
however, he is superior in many ways, particularly in the consistency and coherence of his
doctrine. Schopenhauer's oriental ethic of renunciation seems out of harmony with his metaphysic
of the omnipotence of will; in Nietzsche, the will has ethical as well as metaphysical primacy.
Nietzsche, though a professor, was a literary rather than an academic philosopher. He invented no
new technical theories in ontology or epistemology; his importance is primarily in ethics, and
secondarily as an acute historical critic. I shall confine myself almost entirely to his ethics and his
criticism of religion, since it was this aspect of his writing that made him influential.
His life was simple. His father was a Protestant pastor, and his upbringing was very pious. He was
brilliant at the university as a classicist and student of philology, so much so that in 1869, before
he had taken his degree, he was offered a professorship of philology at Basel, which he accepted.
His health was never good, and after periods of sick leave he was obliged to retire finally in 1879.
After this, he lived in health resorts in Switzerland; in 1888 he became insane, and remained so
until his death. He had a passionate admiration for Wagner, but quarrelled with him, nominally
over Parsifal, which he thought too Christian and too full of renunciation. After the quarrel he
criticized Wagner savagely, and even went so far as to accuse him of being a Jew. His general
outlook, however, remained very similar to that of Wagner in the Ring; Nietzsche's superman is
very like Siegfried, except that he knows Greek. This may seem odd, but that is not my fault.
Nietzsche was not consciously a romantic; indeed he often severely criticizes the romantics.
Consciously his outlook was Hellenic, but