pleasure from achieving my wish; in this sense, whatever I desire is a pleasure, and it may be said,
though somewhat loosely, that pleasures are what I desire. This is the sense of the doctrine which
is a truism.
But if what is meant is that, when I desire anything, I desire it because of the pleasure that it will
give me, that is usually untrue. When I am hungry I desire food, and so long as my hunger persists
food will give me pleasure. But the hunger, which is a desire, comes first; the pleasure is a
consequence of the desire. I do not deny that there are occasions when there is a direct desire for
pleasure. If you have decided to devote a free evening to the theatre, you will choose the theatre
that you think will give you the most pleasure. But the actions thus determined by the direct desire
for pleasure are exceptional and unimportant. Everybody's main activities are determined by
desires which are anterior to the calculation of pleasures and pains.
Anything whatever may be an object of desire; a masochist may desire his own pain. The
masochist, no doubt, derives pleasure from the pain that he has desired, but the pleasure is because
of the desire, not vice versa. A man may desire something that does not affect him personally
except because of his desire-for instance, the victory of one side in a war in which his country is
neutral. He may desire an increase of general happiness, or a mitigation of general suffering. Or he
may, like Carlyle, desire the exact opposite. As his desires vary, so do his pleasures.
Ethics is necessary because men's desires conflict. The primary cause of conflict is egoism: most
people are more interested in their own welfare than in that of other people. But conflicts are
equally possible where there is no element of egoism. One man may wish everybody to be
Catholic, another may wish everybody to be Calvinist. Such non-egoistic desires are frequently
involved in social conflicts. Ethics has a twofold purpose: First, to find a criterion by which to
distinguish good and bad desires; second, by means of praise and blame, to promote good desires
and discourage such as are bad.
The ethical part of the utilitarian doctrine, which is logically independent of the psychological
part, says: Those desires and those actions are good which in fact promote the general happiness.
This need not be the intention of an action, but only its effect. Is there any valid theoretical
argument either for or against this doctrine? We found ourselves faced with a similar question in
relation to Nietzsche.