46 islam, politics and change
communists.³⁶ The revived di networks subsequently developed an
ambiguous relationship towards the regime that revived them, and its
‘evil twin’, Islam-based politics. It was during this period that Hilmy
Aminuddin, the son of a high ranking di leader, Danu Mohammad
Hassan, emerged among di detainees. He served three years in military
detention and was released without charge. This history created a dark
side to the jt-pks history, because many Islam-based activists accused
Hilmy of being co-opted by the military or the intelligence service. jt-pks
rejected the allegation by pointing to the fact that Hilmy was released
without charge.³⁷
The fourth institutional setting was the political laws known as the
package of five laws, one of which – Law No. 8/1985 – stipulated the
mandatory adoption of the state ideology, Pancasila, as the sole basis
for all organisations. This setting drew a complex political constellation:
on one side, there was the bitterest antagonism between the regime and
Islam-based politics; on the other side, the regime was also in conflict
with the joint forces of a group of retired military generals, ex-Masyumi
politicians, and social activists, known as ‘Petition 50’. On yet another side,
the military suffered a further split between Suharto loyalists, under Vice
President Lt. Gen. Sudharmono, and professional soldiers under Chief
Commander Gen. Benny Moerdani resenting the growing Suharto family
businesses.³⁸ The mandatory adoption of Pancasila as the sole ideology
intensified radical tensions among Islam-based organisations. Indeed,
many of them went clandestine – rejecting the law and preferring illegal
status – including the Indonesian Islamic Students (pii)³⁹ and a faction
of the Islamic Student Association (hmi), known as the ‘mpo faction.’
The revival of the former di combatants was conducted by Ali Moertopo, then
Suharto’s personal assistant, against the will of the commander of the State
Intelligence Coordination Agency (Badan Koordinasi Intelejen Negara, bakin)
Sutopo Yuwono. Moertopo insisted that he had personal approval from Suharto:
see Heru Cahyono,Pangkopkamtib Jenderal Soemitro dan Peristiwa 15 Januari
’74(Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1998), 167. Asvi Warman Adam,Menguak Misteri
Sejarah(Jakarta: Kompas, 2010), 222–226.
Yon Machmudi,Islamising Indonesia: The Rise of Jemaah Tarbiyah and The
Prosperous Justice Party(Canberra: anu e Press, 2008), 93–94.
Jun Honna, ‘Military Ideology in Response to Democratic Pressure during the
Late Suharto Era: Political and Institutional Contexts’,Indonesia67 (1999), 77–126.
The pii was founded in 1947, and was an influential network because many of its
activists became notable figures in Indonesian social and political organisations,
until it went clandestine in 1985 when it rejected the adoption of Pancasila as the
sole ideology. It was among the few organisations membership of which included
students of secondary and higher education institutions.