Promotion 437
Turning to price, and acknowledging the
British predilection to associate high price with
high value, one finds that BMW dealers are
paradoxically likely to emphasize the com-
petitive prices of the entry-level models, and
offer deals to fleet buyers and contract hirers
that compare directly with the company car
workhorses from Ford and Vauxhall. The exclu-
sive cachet promised by the perceived pre-
mium price is furthermore threatened in reality
by the fact that roughly 50 000 of the marque
are sold in Britain every year, giving it a market
share almost twice that of Honda and only just
below Citroen.
It is not until one considers placethat the
puzzling gap between reality and perception
begins to close. BMW dealerships are charac-
teristically dressed in high-technology corpor-
ate identity, rigorously controlled from
Munich, which gives out the first signals
consistent with the brand’s evident mystique.
Reception areas resemble private hospitals,
service managers do not accuse customers of
having deviously maltreated their own vehi-
cles, oily overalls are nowhere in sight, and
the atmosphere is reverential. However, these
facts will normally only be known to those
who are already users.
Promotion consists mainly of media adver-
tising, product litetrature and sponsorship. We
have already noted the remarkable consistency
of BMW advertising in Britain over a quarter of
a century. It is heavy on style and low on
objective information, but the aim is clearly to
predispose the audience to seek out the rest of
the story. The literature is another manifesta-
tion of centrally controlled corporate identity,
coolly understated. The choice of sponsorship
associations completes the aspirational mes-
sage to the target audience.
A key feature of the BMW case is that an
admired brand leader is pursuing a promo-
tional strategy which comes dangerously close
to placing all its communicative eggs in one
basket: the P that is explicitly associated with
communication. In so doing, it risks the con-
sequences of ignoring the potential for synergy
among the elements of the marketing mix – or,
more damagingly, counter-synergy.
It is arguable that the first two of the four
Ps have the potential to convey implicit mes-
sages which contradict those explicitly
delivered by the fourth, and that the third can
only redress the imbalance if something else
brings potential customers to the point of sale.
This is a knife-edge strategic situation for the
future of a brand that has become contradict-
orily commonplace for something held to be
exclusive. If the promotional initiative should
be lost for any reason, or if the motorcycles and
the eccentric C1 scooter should together chal-
lenge the carefully cultivated sporting and
executive image of the cars, counter-synergy
could threaten to reverse the prevailing syn-
ergy. Managers with responsibility for ‘promo-
tion’ risk a specific form of Levitt’s famous
‘marketing myopia’ if, simply by default, they
ignore this interaction within the marketing
mix as a system and focus their attention
instead on the one element containing the
overtly ‘communicative’ ingredients.Pulling it all together: the promotional plan
The kind of strategic and tactical decisions
discussed so far in this chapter will ideally be
formalized into a promotional plan, to be dis-
seminated to those charged with the responsi-
bility for translating them into action. Given the
obvious importance of such a document, it is
surprising that most textbooks and guidebooks
for practitioners fall short of the ideal when
they focus within the total marketing plan on
the sub-plan relating to promotion or commu-
nication. An honourable exception is the very
detailed treatment in Stapleton and Thomas
(1998). For present purposes, Table 17.4 aims to
provide a usable template for the construction
of a workable plan. It signals its intended use as
an action plan by posing questions to be