Kaut.ilya’s conception of rationality is goal-oriented and instrumental. The
interest is in the reasoned way to achieve some goal, whatever that goal may be.
The use of reason does not tell us for which goals one should strive, but only how
rationally to strive for them. The Arthas ́a ̄stra is, after all, a manual of instruction
for princes. The discipline Kaut.ilya calls that of critical inquiry is the one which
trains the prince in the way for him to fulfill his projects, having once decided
what those projects are to be. The other sciences, of trade and agriculture, of
policy-making and government, train him in the skills of choosing one objective
rather than another. A person is rational when he uses rational methods to reach
his aims. (Kaut.ilya wanted kings to become philosophers, not as Plato that
philosophers be made kings.) It is not enough to be rational that the aim be in
some sense a “worthy” one, for even worthy goals can be striven for by irrational
means.
Bertrand Russell^6 said that “reason” “signifies the choice of the right means
to an end that you wish to achieve. It has nothing to do with the choice of ends.”
The epic horror of the reasoner concerned the aimlessuse of reason, using
reason capriciously or solely to subvert the goals of others. Kaut.ilya’s defence
makes rationality instrumental and therefore goal-directed. It follows, however,
that a tyrant can be just as rational as a ruler who is beneficent, an atheist as
rational as a believer. If rationality is instrumental, then to act rationally is not
the same as to act well. Followers of reason alone still face the charge of
immorality, hereticism, and untruth.
1.2 Rationality in the Nya ̄ yasu ̄tra
Gautama Aks.apa ̄da’s Nya ̄yasu ̄tra, the redaction of which took place in the first
or second century ad, deals with such themes as the procedures for properly con-
ducting debates, the nature of good argument, and the analysis of perception,
inference, and testimony in so far as they are sources of knowledge. There is
a detailed account of the causal structure of the mind and the nature of its
operation. Certain metaphysical questions are addressed, notably the reality of
wholes, atoms, and universals. At the beginning of his commentary on this
remarkable work, Va ̄tsya ̄yana Paks.ilasva ̄min (ca. ad400) wonders what it is
that makes the Nya ̄ya system distinctive. He answers as follows:
Nya ̄ ya is the examination of things with the help of methods of knowing
(prama ̄n.a). It is an inference supported by observation and authority. This is called
a “critical proof ” (anvı ̄ks.a ̄). A “critical proof ” is the proof of things desired, sup-
ported by observation and authority. The discipline of critical inquiry is the one
which pertains to it, and is also called the science of nya ̄ya or the writings on nya ̄ya.
But an inference that contradicts observation and authority is only a bogus-nya ̄ya.^7Va ̄tsya ̄yana agrees with Kaut.ilya that the study of critical inquiry is one of the
four branches of study, but he insists that it has its own procedures or method-
414 jonardon ganeri