of the object. Without an awareness of the object, there is no success in one’s activ-
ities. But the knower, having grasped the object in thought by some suitable
method, either desires it or wants to avoid it. His “activity” is the effort prompted
by his desire for or aversion of it. “Success” is the coming together of that activity
with its reward. Desiring the object, or wanting to avoid it, one either makes an
effort to obtain it or else to avoid it. One’s “object” is the contentment [one feels]
and the cause of that contentment, or the disdain and the cause of that disdain.Let me take a simple example. Suppose my goal is to acquire a piece of silver. To
succeed, I need to know where silver might be found, and how to recognize it; I
need to be in a position to know, of some object, that it is made of silver. I need
to know other things as well, such as that I have some way of acquiring the silver
once identified. So the reasoned way for me to go about acquiring a piece of silver
is to seek to acquire knowledge of the identifying traits, whereabouts, and means
of acquiring of silver objects. The acquisition of such knowledge becomes itself
a goal, subsidiary to my principal aim of acquiring silver.
In the translation, I have tried to retain an ambiguity in the Sanskrit word
artha, in rendering it as “object.” It can mean both one’s goal, such as acquiring
silver, and also the thing which that goal concerns, the silver itself. It is the target
of one’s endeavor, both as the piece of silver, and equally well as the acquiring
of that silver. Va ̄tsya ̄yana suggests that it can also denote the satisfaction one
feels on achieving one’s goal, or the irritation of not doing so. Later on,^10 he
stresses that, in virtue of the connection that exists between knowledge of the
object and success or failure in one’s goals concerning it, one should employ
some suitable method of knowing if one wants to succeed. The theory of ratio-
nality in this way depends on a theory of the proper means of acquiring true
beliefs.
Kaut.ilya said that the study of critical inquiry is the study of the notion of
“investigating with reasons.” Va ̄tsya ̄yana tells us what a “reason” (hetu) is. It is
a method of acquiring knowledge, a prama ̄n.a. For a “reasoned” inquiry is one
which is based on the acquisition of knowledge. The early Nya ̄ya writers look
closely at the characteristic method that constitutes a rational inquiry. The
opening verse in the Nya ̄vasu ̄tra is a list of 16 items which, according to its
author, comprise the subject matter of the Nya ̄ya system. The first two items are
the various methods of knowing and the domain of knowables. They constitute
the Nya ̄ya epistemology and metaphysics. The next seven are the theoretical
components in the process of critical inquiry: doubt, purpose, observational
data, doctrinal bases, extrapolative demonstration, suppositional reasoning, and
a final decision. The final seven are terms of art in the theory of debate.
Nya ̄yasu ̄tra 1.1.1:
The highest goal in life is reached through knowledge about the nature of:
(a) knowables, methods of knowing,
(b) doubt, purpose, observational data, doctrinal bases, the parts of a demon-
stration, suppositional reasoning, final decision,416 jonardon ganeri