S’s perception is of object xiff:
4) for some F, S sees xas an F, where
S sees xas an Fiff:
1) S’s perception stands in a relation R with x.
2) R is physical (nonverbal).
3) Fx.Cause (4) excludes the case of the ball of dust, for since there is no definite way
by which the person sees the dust, the person does not see any object. It is
necessary for object perception that the object is seen in some definite way.
Clause (3) excludes the case of the mirage, for the person attempts to see the rays
modulo water but the rays are not water. Notice here that “non-errancy” signi-
fies simply an absence of warping, a lack of discord between the perception and
its object, and is not explicated in terms of a correspondence between the object
and a perceptual content. We should think of this absence of warping as a pro-
perty of the perceptual relation, much as transparency is a property of clear
glass. Both are characterized in terms of the lack of a distortion or corruption
of what is seen, and not in terms of representational correspondence. The
passivity of perception is preserved; perception remains free from interpretation
and construction.
It follows from the definition that if one perceives an object, and one does so
by seeing it moduloits having a certain property, then it does indeed have that
property. This is so even though one does not see thatthe object has the prop-
erty. Perceiving xasFdoes not imply believing that xisF, but it does imply that
one would be justified were one to believe that xisF. Perception is an evidential
support for reason, without itself being reasoned (an idea echoed in Roderick
Chisholm’s critical cognitivism^16 ). Later Nya ̄ya writers draw a distinction
between perception that is “with imagination” and perception is “without imagi-
nation.” Bimal Matilal explains the philosophical use here of the term “imagi-
nation” or vikalpaas standing “for anything that, let us say, the mind adds to, or
recognises in, the ‘given.’ ”^17 In the Nya ̄ya theory the object perceived (x) and
also the mode under which it is perceived (F) constitute the perceptual given.
It is the work of the “imagination” to bring them together into a propositional
judgment (xisF).
Buddhist objections to the Nya ̄ya definition focus on instances where percep-
tion does seem to imply belief and inference. There is the case of Uddyotakara’s
rather remarkable claim that we perceive absences. I am looking for a pot. I look
in the kitchen and see no pot. Uddyotakara says: I see the kitchen as qualified by
absence-of-pot and thereby see the absence. The Buddhist Dharmakı ̄rti objects
that this is really a piece of reasoning, an inference from nonobservation. The
inference runs thus. None of the objects which I perceive in the kitchen is a pot.
If there were a pot in the kitchen, I would see it, for my perceptual faculties are
working normally and all other ceteris paribus conditions for perception are met.
Therefore, there is no pot in the kitchen. Dharmakı ̄rti’s point is well taken, but
424 jonardon ganeri