the two. The relation does not obtain between the unseen thing and something
which merely resembles the seen thing. The rational extrapolator, therefore,
must have the capacity to discriminate between the thing in question and other
things which merely resemble it, but do not stand in the appropriate relation to
the unseen thing. Only someone who can tell the difference between a flood river
and a dammed river is entitled to infer from swelling to rain; only someone who
can tell the difference between marching ants and frightened ants is entitled
to infer from marching to rain; and only someone who can tell the difference
between a peacock’s cry and a human impersonator is entitled to draw the infer-
ence from cry to peacock.
The skeptic will reply, of course, that he can always find an alternative expla-
nation for the occurrence of a perceived event, no matter how finely attuned the
perceiver’s discriminating powers. Even the best expert can be fooled by a good
enough forgery. But the question is whether it is rational to concern oneself with
such extreme skeptical possibilities. The Naiya ̄yika proposes a common-sense
maxim for extrapolative reasoning: do not extrapolate beyond the level of your
competence. The skeptic has a different maxim: do not extrapolate if there is any
possibility of error. Since human beings have finite discriminatory capacities,
there is always the possibility of error, and so the skeptic’s maxim implies that it
is never rational to extrapolate. (Jayara ̄s ́i^34 claims even that there is no rational
extrapolation from the rising to the setting of the sun!) To reach the skeptical
conclusion, however, the skeptic has further to prove that his maxim of
extrapolation is the rational one to adopt, while the common-sense Nya ̄ya
maxim is not. And that is precisely what Gautama is here denying.
1.7 Rationality and Debate
H. N. Randle observed a long time ago that “the Naiya ̄yika was from first to last
ata ̄rkika, a disputant.”^35 More recently, B. K. Matilal has called debate the “pre-
ferred form of rationality” in classical India.^36 There is a good deal of truth in
these observations. A sophisticated theory of rationality evolved in the arenas
of debate. Kaut.ilya observed that rationality is about the best means to an end,
and the end of the debater is to win. But what counts as winning a debate? If
the debate is the victory-at-any-cost sort, and a debater wins when his opponent
is lost for words or confused or hesitant, then the best and so most rational way
to proceed would be to employ such tricks as play on the opponent’s weaknesses:
speaking very quickly or using convoluted examples or referring to doctrines of
which one suspects one’s opponent is ignorant. In the other sort of debate, the
truth-directed sort, “winning” is a matter of persuading one’s opponent, and
also an impartial audience, that one’s thesis is true, and the rational debater
must find some other methods. Nothing is more persuasive than an argument
backed up by well-chosen examples and illustrations. And so, when the
Naiya ̄yikas came to codify the form of rational debating demonstration, the
hinduism and the proper work of reason 431